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AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF
RELIGION'S VIEWS OF THE LAW OF
CHURCH AND STATE
THE CRISIS IN THE SANCTITY OF CONSCIENCE IN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
James M. Washington*
Conscience has been a major cultural bedrock of American juris-
prudence, especially in the history and theory of the laws of church
and state. But a rather quiet crisis of confidence in the meaning and
usefulness of conscience has bedeviled American jurisprudence, in
particular, and Western jurisprudence, in general, since the seven-
teenth century. This exploratory Essay' offers an abbreviated gene-
alogy2 of the crisis in the nature and meaning of conscience as it
* Professor of Modern and American Church History, Union Theological Seminary (NY).
B.A., University of Tennessee; M.T.S., Harvard Divinity School; M. Phil., Yale University; Ph.D.,
Yale University. Professor Washington is the author of FRUSTRATED FELLOWSHIP: THE BLACK
BAPTIST QUEST FOR SOCIAL POWER (1986), and has edited two anthologies: A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1986), as well as I HAVE A
DREAM: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1992). He is presently con-
ducting research and writing for a book on the religious history of the civil rights movement,
which is sponsored by a major three-year grant from the Lilly Endowment.
1. This Essay is an extensive revision of my address at the Conference on the Bicentennial of
the Bill of Rights, which was sponsored by the Center for Church/State Studies at the DePaul
University College of Law. I write as a professional church historian who is interested in legal
scholarship rather than as a professional legal scholar. I am grateful for this opportunity to offer
an installment on my long-range plan to produce a book on the history of conscience.
2. 1 use this term to align my project in this Essay with Michel Foucault in his books: THE
ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1971); THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Harper & Row 1972); and POWER/KNOWLEDGE
(Colin Gordon trans., Pantheon 1980). Foucault argued that students of die humanities need to
isolate discontinuities in order to accentuate the role of contingency in human history. He believed
this procedure would disclose the nature and emergence of power relationships. One of the best
introductions to Foucault's thought can be found in JOHN RAJCHMAN, MICHEL FOUCAULT: THE
FREEDOM OF PHILOSOPHY (1985), especially page 118ff on the meaning and sources of the notion
of "genealogy" in Foucault's Nietzschean presuppositions.
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relates to a few aspects of the doctrine of church and state in Anglo-
American legal and religious discussions.
The lack of agreement about the meaning and content of natural
law formed the crux of the problem in relating religion and morality
with jurisprudence in the constitutional debates involved in crafting
the First Amendment to the Constitution. But the present moral
and religious crisis that confronts the Western democratic tradi-
tions, which themselves are the legatees of popular revolutions that
appealed to conscience, resides in reconciling the conflict in the
often different values promoted by religion, government, and social
custom amidst disturbing signs that there are major cultural drifts
toward nihilism. The prevailing view was that the existence of God
was the ultimate constraint upon these great engines of human soci-
ety. This view was aptly expressed by Ren6 Descartes in a 1645
letter to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia:
God has so established the order of things and has joined men together in so
close a society, that even if every man were to be concerned only with him-
self, and to show no charity towards others, he would still, in the normal
course of events, be working on their behalf in everything that lay within his
power, provided that he acted prudently, and, in particular, that he lived in
a society where morals and customs had not fallen into corruption.'
An anxious certainty about God's effectiveness in human affairs is
the unspoken subtext of this paradigmatic statement. It is also the
subtext of Descartes's prodigious intellectual progeny who sought to
rescue the faithful from the creeping pathologies of everyday athe-
ism. They yoked a deep fear of social chaos to their efforts to pro-
vide an intellectual response to the tragic vision.4
This dual fear of social disruption coupled with a growing sense of
God's impotence, if not death, provided the groundwork for what I
call "the quest for a public theodicy." In the modern era, revolu-
tions have often been attempts to fill the personal and public void
created by the real or imagined funeral of God.' At the initiation of
3. LUCIEN GOLDMANN,'THE HIDDEN GOD: A STUDY OF TRAGIC VISION IN THE PENStES OF
PASCAL AND THE TRAGEDIES OF RACINE 28 (Philip Thody trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
1964).
4. Both Luther's famous Good Friday Hymn, God Himself Died, and his notion of the deus
absconditus try to confront the numbing fear that perhaps God is more impotent than the faithful
would ever dare to admit. See JOHN DILLENBERGER, GOD HIDDEN AND REVEALED: THE INTER-
PRETATION OF LUTHER'S DEUS ABSCONDITUS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR RELIGIOUS THOUGHT
(1953); ALAN M. OLSON, HEGEL AND THE SPIRIT: PHILOSOPHY AS PNUEMATOLOGY 121 (1992).
5. See JON P. GUNNEMANN, THE MORAL MEANING OF REVOLUTION 9-50 (1979); MICHAEL
HARRINGTON, THE POLITICS AT GOD'S FUNERAL: THE SPIRITUAL CRISIS OF WESTERN CIVILIZA-
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the Puritan, American, and French revolutions, the classic revolu-
tionary traditions of the modern period,' the revolutionaries often
appealed to the authority of the three respective sovereignties of
God, law, and the people.7
Consequently, each democratic tradition fought paradigmatic rev-
olutions that had the assertion of these sovereignties as their foci.
The quest for the sovereignty of God in human affairs was a major
reason for the revolt of the Puritan element in the English Civil
War. The attempt to insist on the priority of legal constraints on
both the church and the state defined much of the ideology that
shaped the aspirations of the American Revolution. The repudiation
of the sovereignty of both the church and the state in the name of
the sovereignty of the people inspired many during the French
Revolution.
These three impulses are among the major components of the my-
thos of divine providence, state security, and social progress that has
propelled and directed the public trajectories of major historical
changes in the modern era. Reinhart Koselleck argues that these
impulses constitute pathogenetic flaws in modern society that are in
conflict over various utopian visions of society and the realities
spawned by human events.8 His specific argument that the political
alienation of the Enlightenment world view encouraged new forms
of state Absolutism depends upon his general hypothesis that history
induces crises that in turn demand critiques of both status quo as
tradition and authority. The Enlightenment critique of status quo
unwittingly participated in a forced Hobbesian merger between con-
science and judgment. According to Thomas Hobbes, "[A] man's
conscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judg-
ment, so also the conscience may be erroneous." 9 Hobbes's basic ar-
gument in the Leviathan is that it is the primeval right of the state
to correct errors of private judgment in order to maintain civil order
TION (1983).
6. 1 view the Russian Revolution as a postmodern phenomenon insofar as it sought to subvert
modernity.
7. For an excellent study of the development of the praxis of sovereignty, see EDMUND S. MOR-
GAN. INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
(1988).
8. See REINHART KOSELLECK, CRITIQUE AND CRISIS: ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE PATHOGENESIS
OF MODERN SOCIETY (1988).
9. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER. FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH
ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL 239 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. 1962)
(1651).
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and peace. 10 By asserting the right of state power to prevail over
both the possible errors of reason and conscience, Hobbes, and other
subsequent apologists of the Absolutist state, asserted the sover-
eignty of the state to be above that of both logic and revelation.
Hobbes was a major player in the long process of privatizing the
notion of conscience. His reasoning is illustrative. He compared dev-
otees of antinomianism to the citizens of "a commonwealth"'1 and
then asserted that the antinomian can only sin against the individual
conscience
because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so
with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public con-
science, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in
such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but private opin-
ions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey
the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his own eyes. 2
Hobbes was one of the first thinkers in the English-speaking world
to construct legal thought without assuming the existence of God as
a major premise. He believed there are three contenders for sover-
eignty that "set up a supremacy against the sovereignty; canons
against laws; and a ghostly authority against the civil; working on
men's minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signify
nothing .... "'I In effect Hobbes's reaction against the English
Civil War viewed Augustine's Civitas Dei as an undisciplined invisi-
ble "kingdom of fairies" ruled by superstition and ghosts roaming in
the alienated mind of religious enthusiasts who dwell on the out-
skirts of reason's precincts.1 4
Monotheistic and humanistic republicans in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries thought Hobbesianism was an overreaction.
They feared the idea that a state could reserve unto itself what they
felt could only belong to God and citizens. They pondered what
would be the best alternative. Although the interests of theists and
humanists often were in conflict, they often shared a common style
of reasoning that was somewhat syllogistic in form: 1) the Creator is
sovereign; 2) human creatures owe their Creator obedience through
the maintenance of a good conscience which gives guidance to moral
and religious decisions; and 3) in all areas of human affairs, con-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 242.
14. Id.
[Vol. 42:11
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science is sovereign.' 5
For the sake of brevity, allow me to offer a profile of the role of
religious and humanistic appeals to natural law theory as a way of
juxtaposing those appeals over the appeals propounded by advocates
of the doctrine of state Absolutism.
In his Livingston Centennial lectures at Tulane University Law
School in 1936, Professor Roscoe Pound both identified and at-
tacked opponents of natural law who he believed had nothing better
to offer."0 He opined that "[a] psychological realism is abroad which
regards reason as affording no more than a cover of illusion for
processes judicial and administrative which are fundamentally and
necessarily unrational. ' ' 7 Pound believed that this psychologizing
needed to be subjected to the audit of historical criticism in order to
prove that natural law is based on an appeal to reason, not an ap-
peal to any nonrational faculty.' 8 Without using the word "con-
science," he reminded his audience of the importance of natural law
theory in the formation of American law. He then turned his atten-
tion to the various competing definitions of natural law prevalent at
the end of the eighteenth century.
This natural law was variously conceived: sometimes as a vaguely outlined
ideal order of society, sometimes as a body of moral ideals to which conduct
15. Id. This is admittedly a highly sketchy summary of a complicated development. For a su-
perb analytical genealogy of a habitus that made this development possible, see LAWRENCE MAN-
LEY. CONVENTION, 1500-1750 (1980). Manley offers a brilliant argument for the centrality of the
idea and practice of convention in Western thought between 1500 and 1750. Protestants had to
resist and redefine the meaning of convention during this period. Manley's genealogy would have
been greatly strengthened if he had considered the powerful mediating role that the evolving insti-
tution of conscience played. He correctly states, for example, that "[tihe principal vehicle in Eng-
land for the natural law apparatus of the Roman code was canon law, which equally aroused the
antipapist zeal of religious reformers and the jealousy of common lawyers, who," as evident in the
words of Sir Frederick Pollock, "associated it with 'attempts to encroach upon the king's authority
for the benefit of foreigners' and the 'meddling and vexatious jurisdiction of the spiritual courts.' "
Id. at 99. He cites Richard Hooker's Of the Laws of Ec'lesiastical Polity as a landmark attempt
to offer a theological via media between divine, natural, and human law. Id. at 90 (citing RICH-
ARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, in THE FOLGER LIBRARY EDITION OF
THE WORKS OF RICHARD HOOKER (W. Speed Hill ed., 1977)). Yet he overlooks Hooker's empha-
sis on the role of conscience as convention in his Anglican ecclesiology. Of course, Puritanism, far
more than Anglicanism, sought to embody and advance the institution of conscience as the axis of
both theology and jurisprudence. For insightful and helpful discussions of this phenomena, see
LEON HOWARD, ESSAYS ON PURITANS AND PURITANISM 87-112 (James Barbour & Thomas Quirk
eds., 1986), GEOFFREY F. NUTTALL, THE HOLY SPIRIT IN PURITAN FAITH AND EXPERIENCE (2d
ed., University of Chicago Press 1992) (1947), and MICHAEL WALZER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE
SAINTS: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF RADICAL POLITICS (1971).
16. See ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
17. Id. at 27
18. Id.
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should be constrained to conform, sometimes as a body of ideal legal
precepts by which the precepts of -positive law are to be criticized and to
which, so far as possible, they are to be made to conform. But whatever
meaning was given to the ideal or body of ideals, the interpretation and
application of existing rules were to be guided by it, and lawmaking, judicial
reasoning, and doctrinal writing were to be governed by it.' 9
Pound presumed that the history of American jurisprudence would
attest that natural law and reason were synonymous since the refor-
mations of the sixteenth century succeeded in 'divorcing jurispru-
dence from theology.
His own genealogy of this phenomenon is suspect on this point,
however, because of his inattentiveness to the career of the nature
and meanings of conscience in natural law theory. First of all, the
relationship between conscience and natural law needs historical
clarification. They represent the impact of the two diverging streams
of Augustinian and Thomistic thought. More empathically, they re-
flect the earlier divergence between Catholic and Protestant legalis-
tic theology. Without this understanding, it is very difficult to ac-
count for the dominant role of Protestant- theology, in particular, in
American jurisprudence."
Some have argued correctly that trust is the primal psychic sinew
of social bonds, and that contract and covenant theories assumed
different kinds and degrees of trust during their prevalence in seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century social and religious thought. Con-
tract theory became hegemonic as the nations involved in the Reli-
gious Wars embraced the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.21 The
19. Id. at 15-16.
20. See GARRY WILLS. INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(1978). Wills argued that much of the ideology that shaped the Declaration of Independence has
theological roots in Calvinist thought, especially among American Christians, such as the Rever-
end John Witherspoon, who subscribed to the views of Scottish Commonsense Philosophy. This
was most certainly not an original idea. One of the clearest analyses of a chief connection had
already been well-established by gifted American church historians like James Smylie. See James
H. Smylie, Madison and Witherspoon: Theological Roots of American Political Thought, 22
PRINCETON U. LIBR. CHRON. 118 (1961).
21. The last phase of more than a hundred years of warfare between European Catholics and
Protestants was called the "Thirty Years War" (1618-1648). The Peace of Westphalia, signed on
October 27, 1648, was the name given to the accord reached between Western monarchs to cease
fighting. Since the fourth century, cujus regio, ejus religio, the idea that the religion of the mon-
arch should be the religion of the citizenry was accepted in most European countries until the
sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation. Soon after the deaths of major leaders of the Reforma-
tion, such as Martin Luther (1483-1546) and John Calvin (1509-1564), hostilities ensued. Cujus
regio, ejus religio was reconfirmed in the Peace of Augsburg (1955), as well as the Peace of
Westphalia. In the meantime, intellectuals, such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and John Locke
(1632-1704), respectively advocated universal peace and religious toleration. See 3 KENNETH
[Vol. 42:11
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failure of covenant theory as a societal practice gradually occurred
as group conflict and anger assumed the irrelevance of God as a
social reality. Puritan "Preparationist" theologians, especially those
trained at Cambridge University, such as William Ames, Thomas
Hooker, and John Cotton, found their arguments for the social real-
ity of God had been subverted.22 This could be done rather easily
once one perceived that the hubris of their arguments lay in their
fragile "social construction of reality."2 They believed that con-
science is the venue of God in the infrastructure of human personal-
ity. The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) summarized their
conviction: "God alone is lord of the conscience, and hath left it free
from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in any
thing contrary to his Word, or beside it, in matters of faith or wor-
ship." 4 As I have already stated, by 1651, four years after the great
Westminster Assembly had adjoined,25 Hobbes had undermined this
assertion of the supremacy of conscience, and therefore, God.
The English Civil War, the excesses of religious zeal, and weari-
ness prompted many to moderate their radical allegiance to religious
SCOTT LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY: THE THOUSAND YEARS OF
UNCERTAINTY 884-98 (Harper & Row 1975) (1953).
22. Puritans were Calvinists who accented the absolute sovereignty of God. This doctrine left
little formal room for believers to participate in the process of salvation. God either does or does
not save a person from damnation. The rigidity of this doctrine encouraged some to formulate and
embrace what was called "preparationist" theology. According to John Morgan:
This concept of preparation was based on the ability to come first to a recognition of
the condition of one's own soul. Preserving the freedom of the Almighty to act as he
saw fit in individual cases while also encouraging their (as yet unregenerate) parishio-
ners to courses of preparation involved puritan ministers in paradoxical offerings.
JOHN MORGAN, GODLY LEARNING: PURITAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS REASON, LEARNING, AND ED-
UCATION. 1560-1640, at 28-29 (1986). See also PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1939).
23. This phrase refers to the following study: PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966), in
which the authors succeed in dethroning the idea of social determinism without diminishing the
power of social reality. They analyze how individuation is itself a social process that plays a pri-
mordial role in shaping social reality. Berger states this same principle in another influential
study: "The individual is not molded as a passive, inert thing. Rather, he is formed in the course
of a protracted conversation (a dialectic, in the literal sense of the world) in which he is a partici-
pant." PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RE-
LIGION 18 (1967). 1 am suggesting that the Protestant (and modern) attempt to institutionalize
conscience as a moral and psychological center of value independent of religious institutions was a
concerted effort to wed belief in the reality of God with evolving material forces that elevated
reason above revelation.
24. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, PART 1: BOOK OF CONFESSIONS § 6.101 (2d ed. 1970).
25. See ROBERT S. PAUL, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LORD: POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE WEST-
MINSTER ASSEMBLY AND THE "GRAND DEBATE" (1985).
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liberty. Both William Penn's A Persuasive to Moderation to Church
Dissenters, in Prudence and Conscience, written in 1686,26 and John
Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, published in 1689,2 reflect
this Anglo-American sentiment. These two documents also illustrate
how fragile the compromise was between advocates of religious lib-
erty and religious toleration. To illustrate where these two humanis-
tic strata merge and diverge, it is necessary to quote two rather
lengthy statements from these documents.
In the following quotation, William Penn offers an important dif-
ferentiation between the act of defining conscience, and the liberty
and duty that he believes conscience has to act upon its principles.
That there is such a thing as conscience, and the liberty of it, in reference to
faith and worship towards God, must not be denied, even by those that are
most scandalized at the ill use some seem to have made of such pretences.
But to settle the terms: by conscience, I understand, the apprehension and
persuasion a man has of his duty to God: by liberty of conscience, I mean, a
free and open profession and exercise of that duty; especially in worship: but
I always premise this conscience to keep within the bounds of morality, and
that it be neither frantic or mischievous, but a good subject, a good child, a
good servant, in all affairs of life; as exact to yield to Caesar the things that
are Caesar's, as jealous of withholding from God the thing that is God's. In
brief, he that acknowledges the civil government under which he lives, and
that maintains no principle hurtful to his neighbour in his civil property.2 8
Penn sought to rescue conscience from being restricted solely to the
diverse arenas of religious worship. Conscience was that and more.
It was the duty a monotheist owes to the Creator because the rela-
tion between creature and Creator was sacred. He also subtly in-
voked the Biblical paradigm of covenant in order to argue that the
creature's obligation to the Creator is both direct and indirect. Obe-
dience to duly constituted civil authority and communal values is
the indirect way of adhering to conscience. Penn's sense of a pro-
gressive divine illumination led him to conclude that all relation-
ships bear the imprimatur of divinity, and that especially included
the citizen's relation to civil authority. "[F]or duty to such relations
hath a divine stamp; and divine right runs through more things of
the world, andacts of our lives, than we are aware of; and sacrilege
26. 2 WILLIAM PENN, A Persuasive to Moderation to Dissenters, in Prudence and Conscience,
in THE SELECT WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 504 (4th ed., London, William Phillips 1825).
27. The best critical edition and translation of this famous essay can be found in JOHN LOCKE,
EPISTOLA DE TOLERANTIA: A LETTER ON TOLERATION (Raymond Klibansky ed. & J.W. Gough
trans., Latin text ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1968).
28. 2 PENN, supra note 26, at 507.
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may be committed against more than the church."29 This paradig-
matic Quaker defense of progressive revelation had a humanist co-
rollary which had one of its best expressions in the writings of Pierre
Bayle.30 Bayle, writing under the pseudonym Sieur Jean Fox de
Bruggs, articulated a view of conscience shared by many humanists.
Bayle argued:
It is so evident that our conscience is a light by which we know that this or
that is good or bad, that nobody, apparently, doubts at all that this is the
definition of conscience. It is just as evident that every creature which
judges an action to be good or bad assumes that there is a law or rule con-
cerning rightness or wrongness of actions .... "31
Rather than repudiate the notion, conscience became the linchpin of
a doctrine of institutionalism. But the need to temper religious ex-
cesses among religious radicals increasingly lent support to Quakers
like Penn who urged the Society of Friends to embrace a communal
interpretation of divine illumination. There was a pervasive fear of
the dangers of religious anarchy. The notion of anarchy was equated
with the idea of radical individualism, and eventually even with the
eighteenth-century idea of autonomy which Immanuel Kant argued
in his famous essay, What Is Enlightenment?, constituted the epi-.
center of Enlightenment culture.32
Penn's convictions were not simply a matter of metaphysics. He
embodied these convictions in his "Holy Experiment" which became
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."3 John Locke, the author of the
29. 2 id. at 508. For a fine discussion of the nuanced development of social consciousness
among the Society of Friends, see RICHARD T. VANN, THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH
QUAKERISM, 1655-1755 (1969).
30. Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), an important precursor of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment,
was one of the most prominent proponents of radical religious toleration. He was exceptional in
his advocacy in so far as his concept of religious toleration included Unitarians, Jews, and Mos-
lems. See FRANKLIN L. BAUMER, MODERN EUROPEAN THOUGHT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
IDEAS, 1600-1950, at 96-116 (1977).
31. This quotation from Bayle's pseudonymous work titled, TRADUIT DE L'ANGLOIS SIEUR
JEAN FoX DE BRUGGS PAR M.J.F. (1686), was translated from the French in Raymond Klibansky,
Preface to LOCKE, supra note 27, at xii. Klibansky skillfully and correctly identifies Bayle as the
author of this pseudonymous publication.
32. See IMMANUEL KANT, What is Enlightenment?, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS AND "WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?" 85 (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1959). Kant wrote this essay in 1784. He declared, "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-
incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction
from another." Id.
33. See MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
65-68 (1992).
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fundamental laws of the colony of North Carolina, 4 also tried to
make conscience an important cornerstone of his philosophy of
law.35 While Locke's understanding of conscience was deeply shaped
by the Puritanism of his own parents, his influence upon the human-
istic proponents of natural law was considerable.
John Locke was less concerned with yoking his views, which were
an anticipation of the English Act of Toleration (1689),36 than with
theological convictions even though he was careful to assume them.
In his Letter on Toleration, Locke made an enduring distinction be-
tween "private judgment" and public responsibility in matters con-
cerning primary moral and religious convictions.3 7 Proponents of re-
ligion have a duty to propagate their faith. But he argues, "However
great, therefore, may be your profession of goodwill and your efforts
for the salvation of men's souls, a man cannot be forced to be saved.
In the end he must be left to himself and his own conscience." 38
This argument addressed the enormous problem of religious anar-
chy. But the issue of potential state infringements upon religious
liberty remained. Locke pursued this challenge in a Socratic
manner:
But you will say: What if the magistrate's decree should order something
which seems unlawful to the conscience of a private person? I answer: If the
commonwealth is governed in good faith, and the counsels of the magistrate
are really directed to the common good of the citizens, this will seldom hap-
pen. But if it should chance to happen, I say that such a private person
should abstain from the action which his conscience pronounces to be unlaw-
ful, but undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear.
For the private judgment of any person concerning a law enacted in political
matters, and for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that
law, nor does it deserve toleration. But if the law concerns things which lie
34. See RICHARD I..AARON, JOHN LOCKE 16 (3d ed. 1970).
35. Id. at 74-82.
36. Y.B. I W. & M., ch. 18 (1689). Although the English Toleration Act of 1689 extended
religious liberty to Protestant dissenters from the Church of England, it did not grant religious
liberty to Unitarians and Roman Catholics. The Act's legal title was actually "An act for exempt-
ing their Majesties' Protestant subjects, dissenting from the Church of England, from the penal-
ties of certain laws." But it is commonly known as the English Act of Toleration. According to its
preamble, its objective was twofold. It granted "some ease to scrupulous consciences, in the exer-
cise of religion," and sought "to unite their Majesties' Protestant subjects in interest and affec-
tion." The preamble and full text of this Act can be found in PHILIP SCHAFF, THE PROGRESS OF
RELIGIOUs FREEDOM AS SHOWN IN THE HISTORY OF TOLERATION ACTS 119-25 (New York,
Charles Scribner's Sons 1889).
37. LOCKE, supra note 27, at 127, 129, 131. See both the preface and introduction to this
critical edition of Locke's famous published missive where the historical context and intellectual
implications of his advocacy of toleration are explored in detail.
38. Id. at 101.
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outside the magistrate's province, as for example that the people, or any
part of it, should be compelled to embrace a strange religion and adopt new
rites, those who disagree are not obliged by that law, because political soci-
ety was instituted only to preserve for each private man his possession of the
things of this life, and for no other purpose. The care of his soul and of
spiritual matters, which does not belong to the state and could not be sub-
jected to it, is reserved and retained for each individual. 9
With this distinction, Locke moved the center of discussion away
from Hobbes's notion of the state as the arbiter of bellum omnium
contra omnes." Locke expanded the humanist interpretation of the
place of conscience in natural law theory. While he accepted the
privatization of conscience, his anthropology saw conscience as the
sanctuary of tradition. As the sacred house of tradition, conscience
became a promoter of civil peace and continuity. Conscience be-
came the seat of moral authority as defined by tradition. As long as
cultural memory and homogeneity remained unscathed by time and
circumstance, conscience could be a sure moral guide for both the
individual and the state.
In summary, the theocentric, humanist, and absolutist bases for
the centrality of conscience differed in the degree to which they be-
lieved human nature was corrupt or corruptible. The long shadow of
Calvinism's grim view of human ability -constantly provoked its
challengers who were inspired by their discovery that human events
can be both capricious and promising. These theological and philo-
sophical anthropologists were far removed from'the scientific and
psychological works of their successors from the late eighteenth cen-
tury onward. But their efforts to fuse theology and philosophy in the
service of jurisprudence created an important but insecure institu-
tion within the interdisciplinary arenas of legal thought."1
Nonetheless, despite its schizoid history, the appeal to conscience
as the basis for religious liberty and toleration had become a fragile
but distinctive American political tradition by the late eighteenth
century. In 1791, most political and ecclesiastical leaders in the An-
glo-American world assumed that "the rights of conscience" were
natural and inalienable. But this did not forestall nearly 150 years
39. Id. at 127, 129.
40. KOSELLECK, supra note 8, at 53-61.
41. The following monographs offer excellent inroads into this complex historiography: RICH-
ARD L. GREAVES, THEOLOGY AND REVOLUTION IN THE SCOTTISH REFORMATION: STUDIES IN THE
THOUGHT OF JOHN KNOX (1980); CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION (1965); PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS (1956); JOHN T. MCNEILL,
THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF CALVINISM (1954).
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of theological and philosophical debates about the meaning of this
phrase."2 Between the outbreak of the English Civil War in 1642
and the ratification of the American Bill of Rights in 1791, the at-
tempt to interface Calvinist and humanist republicanism succeeded.
But this did not happen without much anguish.43
Without taking the evolving power of the nation state seriously
enough, many belletrist and religious subjectivists abandoned the
brutalities of "marketplace culture.""" But neither the engines of
capital nor propriety could regain enough moral verve to challenge
the state's willingness to desecrate the human body through the ab-
rogation of human rights (especially in the form of slavery) and
through the carnage of warfare. By the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, conscience, the one institution that provided an opportunity to
unify humanists and religionists had become so sacred that few
bothered to discuss what they meant by it. This lack of discussion
unwittingly subjected conscience to interpretations that excluded its
advocates' claims for its sacredness from judicial ameliorations
when it found itself in conflict with the interests of the state. The
subordination of the sacredness of conscience tempted students of
jurisprudence to mix theological and psychological speculation with-
out always being aware of the difference. Moreover, it subjugated
the sacred claims of conscience to the judicial review of the state.
This meant that those who appealed to the sacred authority of con-
science in efforts to make the state subject to transcendent values
beyond national self-interest, placed the moral and religious con-
straints of conscience upon the state at risk.
In the remainder of this Essay, I would like to telescope this prob-
lem with another hypothesis. I believe radical forms of historical
contingencies created the precondition for what I call "juridical
cults of assurance."45 The Founders of the American Republic had
42. For a helpful summary and analysis of this enduring intellectual debate during this period,
see KENNETH E. KIRK, CONSCIENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CASUISTRY 123-
290 (1927).
43. The history of Baptist opposition to established churches is one of the best illustrations of
this point. For an account of this opposition, see both volumes of WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW
ENGLAND DISSENT. 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(1971).
44. See JEAN-CHRISTOPHE AGNEW, WORLDS APART: THE MARKET AND THE THEATER IN AN-
GLO-AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1550-1750, at 188 (1986); see also J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVEL-
LIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
462-552 (1975).
45. Keeping in mind Koselleck's view of Absolutism as the pathogenesis of modern society,
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to contend with the enormous anxieties of historic societal changes
unleashed by revolutionary ferment." These cults that had their an-
alogue in the older religious revolutionary traditions appealed to
three historic manifestations of the authority of sovereignty: cove-
nant, contract, and constitution. As attested by many excellent re-
cent studies,47 the monotheistic and humanistic republicans who
crafted the Constitution of the United States, as well as the state
constitutions, used the moral and religious discourse of these forms
of sovereignty in order to garner public support for their
handywork."I One American historian has referred to this venera-
tion of constitutionalism as the "cult of the constitution. ' 49
Religious views of the law of church and state have relied heavily
on asserting the natural and transcendent rights of conscience by
establishing "conscience as a notional institution."5 In his 1833
KOSELLECK, supra note 8, I find Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary medicinal definition of
"cult" helpful in advancing my argument here. It defines cult as "a system for the cure of disease
based on dogma set forth by its promulgator." WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 314
(9th ed. 1990).
46. ELIE HALfVY, THE BIRTH OF METHODISM IN ENGLAND (Bernard Semmel ed. & trans.,
University of Chicago Press 1971). Several scholars have pursued Elie Hal~vy's intriguing thesis
that Britain was spared such anxieties because of the supposedly "psychologically repressive" ef-
fects of the Evangelical revivals. Semmel's excellent introduction offers a valuable assessment of
recent contributors to, and critics of, Hal6vy's thesis. See ELIE HALfVY, METHODISM AND
REVOLUTION in HALtVY, supra, at 1. Edward P. Thompson advanced the most influential contri-
bution and expansion of this thesis. See E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORK-
ING CLASS (1st Vintage ed. 1966) (1963). See especially the chapter titled, "The Transforming
Power of the Cross." Id. at 350. But Semmel himself authored the most effective and knowledgea-
ble rejoinder to the misleading idea that Methodism was psychologically repressive. See BERNARD
SEMMEL, THE METHODIST REVOLUTION (1973).
47. The most influential analysis of this subject in the last twenty years is by Garry Wills. See
WILLS, supra note 20. However, Alan Heimert overemphasized the role of Calvinists in the
Revolution, and subsequent constitutional debates, during a period when Calvinism was in a
profound state of transformation. See ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND:
FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO THE REVOLUTION (1966) for a finely woven analysis of the role
of religion in the political culture of the early Republic during a time when scholars were too
inattentive to this subject. The following studies have also made major contributions to our under-
standing of the role of religionists and humanists in the early republic: FRED J. HOOD, REFORMED
AMERICA: THE MIDDLE AND SOUTHERN STATES, 1783-1837 (1980); HENRY F. MAY, THE EN-
LIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976); MARK A. NOLL, PRINCETON AND THE REPUBLIC, 1768-1822:
THE SEARCH FOR A CHRISTIAN ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE ERA OF SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH
(1989); JACK R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1978).
48. There are many fine studies of the rhetoric of the American Revolution that allude to the
interface of religious language and revolutionary discourse. Perhaps the most engaging one is
SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD 132-75 (1978). See also MORGAN, supra note 7.
49. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 22 (1987).
50. This term is my way of locating "conscience" as a key member of the fundamental ideas
and values which jurisprudence seeks to uphold. "Conscience" has been both a symbol and a mode
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Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,51 Justice
Joseph Story offered a juridical description of this strange institu-
tion as a precondition of law: "The rights of conscience are, indeed,
beyond the just reach of any human power. They are given by God,
and cannot be encroached upon by human authority, without a
criminal disobedience of the precepts of natural, as well as revealed
religion." ' 2 This belief assumed that there are religious and moral
constraints upon the state's claims to sovereignty. As a fundamental
principle of American legal thought, this notion of "the rights of
conscience" made the predication of an amazing spectra of religious
and humanistic beliefs and practices possible.
Justice Story's remarks, however, contain a subtext that assumes
conscience is a bridge between "natural" and "revealed" religion.
Story assumed knowledge of the histories, theologies, and anthropol-
ogies of religious liberty and religious toleration that are foreign to
many. I cannot review all these factors in this paper. But I do wish
to offer a genealogical assessment of some of the religious bases for
the meanings of conscience in American jurisprudence. I begin with
the assertion that the notion of conscience has suffered greatly at
the hands of irreversible historical and cultural changes. Therefore,
I am suggesting that we need to expand the juridical role of con-
science by redefining it as "adherence to the sanctity of the body."
The importance of the sanctity of the body itself has been ex-
cluded from religious arguments: 1) for religious liberty; 2) against
the fugitive slave law tradition; and 3) for both religious and selec-
tive conscientious objection to military service. These three jurispru-
dential traditions show how appeals to the natural rights of con-
science without reference to some identifiable notion of the sanctity
of the body, a primal natural right, continues to extend an unwar-
ranted patent to an institution in dire need of renovation.53
of discourse that signifies this jurisprudential culture. I agree with Anthony Giddens that such
signifiers and signification constitute institutions: "Symbolic orders and associated modes of dis-
course are a major institutional locus of ideology." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 32-33 (1984).
51. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Carolina
Academic Press 1987) (1833).
52. 2 Id. § 990, at 701.
53. 1 see Native American beliefs in the sacredness of the land as a significant, but concurrent
religious argument for the law of church and state whose history needs to be reconstructed. For
example, the Otoe land dispute and other American Indian claims that appealed to different no-
tions of religious liberty would be an effective and important way to expand the definition of
conscience to include the sanctity of the land. Parenthetically, it could also be a way of critiquing
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My historical diagnosis of the crisis in the institution of con-
science might seem premature and unwarranted. In one sense it is.
Much further historical reconstruction and analysis of this notional
institution need be done. Paul Lehmann's call for more attention to
this area of neglect still remains largely unheeded. He said:
A full-length study of what has happened to conscience in the Western cul-
tural tradition is overdue. A carefully documented and sufficiently compre-
hensive account of what might be called "the shape of conscience," i.e., an
interpretive framework other than that offered by moral theology in which
the ethical nature and behavioral effectiveness of the conscience might once
again be clearly and persuasively understood, is not at hand.54
This inattentiveness to the obvious, yet neglected, story of the im-
pact of the notional institution of conscience on Western jurispru-
dence has eclipsed the past role of the ontology of conscience in the
epistemological, cultural, and anthropological dimensions of the
church and state debate.
In fact, most of the historiological debate about the role of con-
science in Anglo-American jurisprudence as it relates to the
problems attending the discussion concerning relations between
church and state have largely failed to relate to the broader theolog-
ical and philosophical debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Fortunately, some students of jurisprudence are beginning
to redress the seeming immunization of this noble discipline against
the Western crisis in the foundations of epistemology. 5 As long as
there is unconsciousness and indifference about the impact that the
the inordinate sway that the praxis and philosophy of ownership has in American jurisprudence.
Time and space prevent me from discussing this here. See BERLIN BASIL CHAPMAN, THE OTOES
AND MISSOURIAS: A STUDY OF INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 223-89 (1965);
VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 217-46
(1983); EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT, at 403-28 (1991). Several excellent studies on Native
American religious freedom can be found in the HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. See, e.g., Sharon O'Brien, A
Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK, supra, at 27. For
a fine examination of the idea of land as an embodiment of the sacred, see BELDEN C. LANE,
LANDSCAPES OF THE SACRED: GEOGRAPHY AND NARRATIVE IN AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY (1988).
54. PAUL L. LEHMANN, ETHICS IN A CHRISTIAN CONTEXT 327 n.2 (1963).
55. Although the literature on this subject is vast, several recent studies provide helpful inroads
into, and exits out of, this problematic intellectual junction. See ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLIT-
ICS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1989); HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Eng. ed., Crossroad 1982) (1965); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSO-
PHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE
(1987); POST MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN (Anthony
Carty ed., 1990).
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assumptions of foundationalism as a cognitive presupposition and in-
tellectual habitus have had upon Western jurisprudence remain reg-
nant, the pressing postmodern need to develop a jurisprudence that
is multicultural, nonracist, and nonsexist will continue to go unmet.
Although several astute students of jurisprudence and the humani-
ties have embraced and engaged this eventful development in the
history of the Western psyche, much work remains to be done.
Any capital improvements on the venerable house of conscience,
however, requires an examination of the deterioration of its infra-
structure along the lines of its inherent epistemological, cultural,
and anthropological faults. Raising consciousness about the corro-
sion of the epistemological basis for the institution of conscience
does not preclude the need to describe the equally disabling effect of
cultural diffusion and despair. Paul Tillich often referred to this
modern development as heteronomy.56 This is a useful descriptive,
term for pinpointing the influence of the decline in the authority of
religion in the public sphere, especially in its monotheistic guise. A
careful analysis of how these faults developed in each of these his-
toric debates mentioned above would offer more specific insights
into the nature of the crisis in the religious authority of conscience. 57
An abbreviated profile of these lines in the structure of con-
science, however, at least provides a preliminary index. Because it is
so diffuse, the cultural fault line of conscience with its jagged edges
cuts crudely into the preserves of clarity. Devotees of cultural dis-
cernment and historical representation find this sort of work difficult
and often frustrating. Despite these technical prohibitions, I have
found that this intricate pastiche is perhaps most discernible in the
ideological debates about the proper role of religion in fostering so-
cial values. But the distinction that I am making between cultural
and anthropological dimensions of conscience is largely a twentieth-
century development.
The cultural fault line in the institution of conscience is the mac-
rocosmic expression of the microcosmic crisis in the definition of hu-
56. See I PAUL TILLICH. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: REASON AND REVELATION BEING AND GOD
83-86 (1951) (discussing the conflict within actual reason and the quest for revelation - auton-
omy against heteronomy); see also JAMES LUTHER ADAMS, PAUL TILLICH'S PHILOSOPHY OF CUL-
TURE. SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 15-64 (1965) (providing an engaging and reliable analysis of Til-
lich's overall project, and the place of "heteronomy" in Tillich's basic concepts).
57. But, alas! time limitations insist that this be pursued on another occasion. Instead of pursu-
ing that trajectory, continuing a descriptive outline of the cultural and anthropological fault lines
within the notional institution of conscience constitutes the remainder of my agenda in this paper.
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manity. This is where ideology and theology diverge. In its best mo-
ments, theology pursues and defends an eschatological ontology
that is invested in answering the question: "Given the reality of
God's presence within the created order, who is my neighbor?" Ide-
ologists pursue a different question: "Given the possibility of per-
fectibility of the human race, what humans are more likely to be
perfected?"
These questions were merged in late eighteenth-century North
America even though Joseph Haroutunian is correct in his astute
observation that "in a way, the deepest tragedy of the modern reli-
gious mind is the separation of ethics from theology.""8 He believed
that this fissure occurred during the eighteenth century:
The separation of ethics from theology established by eighteenth century
rationalism has sunk into our consciousness so deeply that we have become
well-nigh incapable of understanding the Biblical point of view, according to
which man is at all times and for all things responsible to God.59
The Bill of Rights does more than adjudicate interests. It defines
social values amidst gargantuan evidence that religion could no
longer do it without adjusting to. the subordination of the sover-
eignty of God at the expense of the supposed elevation of the sover-
eignty of the people. The people of God and the new republic of
peoplehood tried to join forces to constrain the power of the state.
We should be careful not to underestimate how much the Foun-
ders of the American constitutional tradition valued what the classi-
cal modernists taught them about how to relate societal structure to
human ability. The key is to see that relationality is what dialogue
and dialectics have in common. Later such different figures as
Mother Ann Lee (the great shaman of the Shakers), Karl Marx,
Sven Kierkegaard, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Frederick
Douglass perceived within their own spheres of influence that re-
demptive "development" seldom happens unless power is disclosed,
reviewed, and redefined. 0
58. Joseph Haroutunian, The Gospel and Our Situation, 2 RADICAL RELIGION 31 (Spring,
1937). See also JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN, PIETY VERSUS MORALISM: THE PASSING OF NEW ENG-
LAND THEOLOGY (Harper & Row 1970) (1932); MAY, supra note 47.
59. Haroutunian, supra note 58, at 31.
60. For a discussion of the cultural and sociological uses of developmentalism, see MARSHALL
BERMAN, ALL THAT Is SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY (1982) and
ROBERT A. NISBET, SOCIAL CHANGE AND HISTORY: ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN THEORY OF DE-
VELOPMENT (1969). The concept gained wide acceptance among German Protestants at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century who identified with Romanticism. See JOHN EDWARD TOEws, HE-
1992]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
Both popular, political, and religious Romanticism profited and
shaped the idea of the perfectibility of humanity. This horizon
would not have been as visible, or necessary, had it not encountered
republicanism's discovery that historical change need not be total
change in order to dislodge both the myth of absolute human cor-
ruption and absolute human greed. Neither utopia nor the common-
wealth of complete self-interest could supersede human ingenuity
and historical surprise. The legatees of constitutionalism discovered,
along with John Locke, the importance of seeing "imagination as a
means of grace."61
By the end of the nineteenth century, it was evident that the ju-
ridical use of conscience had been diminished by the decline of its
authority. It was no longer considered by some to be a transcendent
reality brokered by the human will. It had been reduced to a state
of individual consciousness. The following quotation from Herman
Melville's Billy Budd 2 illustrates this point. Melville has his narra-
tor characterize the conscience of Budd's tormentor, Mr. Claggert:
But how with Claggert's conscience? For though consciences are unlike as
foreheads, every intelligence, not excluding the scriptural devils who "be-
lieve and tremble," has one. But Claggert's conscience being but the lawyer
to his will, made ogres of trifles, probably arguing that the motive imputed
to Billy in spilling the soup just when he did, together with the epithets
alleged, these, if nothing more, made a strong case against him; nay, justi-
fied animosity into a sort of retributive righteousness.6 3
Melville labored until his death in 1891 with the implications of a
committed conscience. He sought to portray the tragic and ambigu-
ous consequences of the reign of conscience when this notional insti-
tution is given the freedom to exhaust itself in the relentless pursuit
of principles.6 4
Melville portrays the agony of the conscience as a bondage of the
will burdened with the vicissitudes of contingency. 6 The domain of
GELIANISM: THE PATH TOWARD DIALECTICAL HUMANISM, 1805-1841, at 30-67 (1980).
61. See ERNEST LEE TuVESON. THE IMAGINATION AS A MEANS OF GRACE: LOCKE AND THE
AESTHETICS OF ROMANTICISM (1960).
62. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, reprinted in THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN LITERATURE
990 (Sculley Bradley et al. eds., 3d ed. 1967).
63. Id. at 1020.
64. Melville uses several terms that form the coterie of images and concepts that inform my
view here. They include "sin" and "civilization." See T. WALTER HERBERT, JR., MARQUESAN EN-
COUNTERS: MELVILLE AND THE MEANING OF CIVILIZATION (1980); R.W.B. LEWIS, THE AMERI-
CAN ADAM: INNOCENCE, TRAGEDY, AND TRADITION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1955).
65. See LEWIS, supra note 64, at 127-55.
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conscience finds itself besieged by the surds of time, space, and mys-
tery. In an attempt to explain Claggert's motivation for persecuting
Billy Budd, Melville offers two important insights into the social sta-
tus of conscience during the centennial year of the ratification of the
Bill of Rights. The courtroom replaces the confessional in the archi-
tecture of the human psyche's moral infrastructure. Subsequently,
the lawyer, rather than the priest, becomes the advocate for right-
eousness. The consequence of these changes is the unwitting expan-
sion of the role of conscience as an agency of unholy alliances.
According to Melville, "every intelligence, not excluding the
scriptural devils who 'believe and tremble,' has one [a con-
science]." ' This statement recognizes the complete universalization
of the institution of conscience by making it a byproduct of intelli-
gence. In the context of Billy Budd, intelligence is equivalent to cul-
ture. Should Billy Budd be held accountable for not knowing the
protocols of life aboard ship? Missionaries raised similar questions
about the "heathen." Rather than make conscience, sub specie
aeternitatis, a mystical governor, it had become synonymous with
rationality. A link between this shift and the rationale for education
can be seen in Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy. 7 But on
the North American side of the Atlantic, Horace Bushnell had al-
ready anticipated the erosion of the authority of the religious under-
standing of conscience by making the well-being of conscience de-
pendent upon nurture (or education) rather than revelation."'
Others were less willing, however, to dethrone the religious defini-
tion and authority of conscience. Just three years before Melville's
death, Philip Schaff, the distinguished Professor of Church History
at Union Theological Seminary, offered one of the most forthright
descriptions and defenses of the religious understanding of con-
science and its relation to religious liberty:
Religious liberty is a natural, fundamental, and inalienable right of every
man. It is founded in the sacredness of conscience, which is the voice of God
66. See MELVILLE, supra note 62, at 1020.
67. See MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE & ANARCHY: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
CRITICISM AND FRIENDSHIP'S GARLAND BEING THE CONVERSATIONS, LETTERS, AND OPINIONS OF
THE LATE ARMINIUS, BARON VON THUNDERTEN-TRONCKH 49 (1883) ("We are not in danger
from Fenianism, fierce and turbulent as it may show itself; for against this our conscience is free
enough to let us act resolutely and put forth our overwhelming strength the moment there is any
real need for it."). For a brilliant analysis of Arnold's Culture & Anarchy, and some interesting
allusions to the impact of John Stuart Mill on both Arnold and the great American jurist, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, see LIONEL TRILLING, MATTHEW ARNOLD 252-91 (1939).
68. See HORACE BUSHNELL, CHRISTIAN NURTURE (1960).
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in man and above the reach and control of human authority. There is a law
above all human law. It is written not on parchment and tables of stone, but
on the heart of man by the finger of God.6 '
But Schaff certainly recognized the antinomian implications of this
position even though he held to the conviction that God "alone is the
author and lord of conscience, and no power on earth has a right to
interpose itself between them. '70 Unlike others, however, Schaff was
an adamant foe of religious toleration." He felt it was an unwar-
ranted and unprincipled stopgap between religious persecution and
religious liberty. Because religious liberty is founded on conscience,
he argued that sacredness of conscience precluded compromise. He
dismissed the fear of antinomianism implicit in his view. He argued
that "[l]iberty will be abused to the end of time. But no amount of
abuse can abolish the right use. The same sun which spreads light
and life promotes decay and death.I 72 But in his latest book,73 Pro-
fessor Robert T. Handy demonstrates that a kind of political and
social decay of the basis for the separation of church and state was
steadily distending even as death engulfed Schaff in 1893.""
Melville shows how ethical complications can be engendered by
the moral myth of conscience. He endows Claggert with the self-
serving compromises that the brokered conscience makes when it
serves the warped interests of a polymorphously perverse will.
Granted, the image of Claggert as a latent homosexual would not
pass many contemporary tests for either fairness or sensitivity. Nor
would the portrayal of Billy Budd as the innocent victim of Clag-
gert's inward torture survive the cynicism of late twentieth-century
American culture. Yet Melville's psychodrama arrests all appeals to
conscience with a nagging question: If conscience has become the
servant of a clinically narcissistic will, is not justice, as well as truth,
impossible to attain under such a regime?
The same problem has its societal analogue in the genealogy of
the law of church and state. The work of reconstructing much of
69. SCHAFF, supra note 36, at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. See ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN
AMERICA, 1880-1920 (1991).
74. See PHILIP SCHAFF: HISTORIAN AND AMBASSADOR OF THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH, SELECTED
WRITINGS (Klaus Penzel ed., 1991); GEORGE H. SHRIVER, PHILIP SCHAFF: CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR
AND ECUMENICAL PROPHET 84-107 (1987).
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this genealogy has been done by scholars such as Anson Phelps
Stokes, Elwyn Smith, Robert T. Handy, and Glenn T. Miller.75
Their prior labor therefore makes my task much easier. These es-
teemed friends of religious liberty pursued their admirable task,
however, from a rightly apologetic viewpoint. Religious liberty is in-
deed one of those precious political inheritances that requires "eter-
nal vigilance" lest we lose it. But even during the centennial year of
the Bill of Rights, some shared Melville's concerns about the moral
and epistemological crisis within the notional institution of con-
science. Many saw that the denial of the rights of conscience was a
gargantuan problem. But few could admit that there was a problem
in the very meaning of this venerable conceptual apparatus that had
provided the fundamental moral basis for the liberties guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights.
The decline of the culture of conscience is both a great tragedy
and a costly boon. Although the "terrors of history' 76 have checked,
if not checkmated, military henotheism, assaults against the sanctity
of the body, one of the embarrassing legacies of modern henotheism,
continue to increase with more sophisticated, if not greater,
efficiency.
But the ascendancy of heteronomy cannot be fully explained by
referring to the development of the modern nation-state. The decline
in the moral, intellectual, and liturgical authority of institutional re-
ligion reflects an ancient fissure in Christian social teachings7 7 be-
tween Pauline anthropology78 and the development of Constantini-
75. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOV-
ERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); GLENN T. MILLER, RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY IN AMERICA: HISTORY AND PROSPECTS (1976); ELWYN A. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHURCH-STATE THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION-
ARY ERA (1966); ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950);
Robert T. Handy, The American Tradition of Religious Freedom: An Historical Analysis, 13 J.
PUB. L. 247 (1964). See especially Elwyn A. Smith's essay, Religion and Conscience in Constitu-
tional Law, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE 243 (Elwyn A. Smith
ed., 1966).
76. See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE MYTH OF THE ETERNAL RETURN; OR, COSMOS AND HISTORY 139,
141-62 (Willard R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1971) (1954).
77. See ERNST TROELTSCH. THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES (Olive Wyon
trans., Harper & Row 1960) (1931).
78. There has been a tendency to interpret the Apostle Paul's notion of "conscience" as an
individualistic construct. Bishop Krister Stendahl, the former dean of Harvard Divinity, critiqued
this interpretation in his 1961 address before the American Psychological Association. See
KRISTER STENDAHL, The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West, in PAUL
AMONG JEWS AND GENTILES 78 (1976).
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anism by the fifth century."9 After nearly five centuries of
martyrdom, Christians reached an unsettling compromise with their
host, the Roman Empire. Both the clarity and anxiety endemic to
Constantinianism, sealed in the Council of Nicaea in 325, was best
expressed by Augustine of Hippo in Book XIX of his City of God.80
Augustine believed that Christian soteriology offers the believer the
opportunity to reside eventually in a "heavenly city."81 But in the
meantime, as creatures of time, they are consigned to the vileness
and vicissitudes of the earthly polis:
This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all
nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scru-
pling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby
earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however vari-
ous these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace.82
Augustine saw this bifocal nature of Christian discipleship as a nec-
essary compromise, not as an abdication of Christian identity. But
for nearly a thousand years from the death of Augustine in 430, the
regnant impulse within Western Christendom was to identify Chris-
tian interests with those of the state. Questioning and challenging
the religious basis for such alliances with the earthly polis became
one of the hallmarks of the sixteenth-century Reformation. Differ-
ent conceptions of "Christian society" vied for supremacy as Chris-
tian nations embraced the praxis of coercion as a form of evangel-
ism. Religious toleration, and most certainly religious liberty, did
not begin to become a legitimate part of the public sphere until the
late seventeenth century.
As theologians, especially Protestant ones, continued to debate
and define the meaning of Christian discipleship because of the in-
ternal pressures following the Reformation, many of them also
sought to include an understanding of the Christian's relation to
civil society. This endeavor consumed the energies of both religious
and secular intellectuals. Some, such as Rousseau, divorced them-
79. Between the years 413 and 426, Augustine of Hippo crafted the classic Christian differenti-
ation between the privileges of the state and the aspirations of the Christian in his Civitas Dei.
See SAINT AURELIUS AUGUSTIN, THE CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods trans.), reprinted in 2 A SE-
LECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH I (Philip
Schaff ed., Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1956).
80. Id. at 397.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 412-13. For an excellent analysis of this treatise and its social context, see R.A
MARKUS, SAECULUM: HISTORY AND SOCIETY IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE (1970).
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selves from the issues of religious discipleship, and began to address
the crisis in the meaning of citizenship in a bourgeois society exclu-
sive of the problem of discipleship. They broadened the discussion to
ask, "What are those human rights which no state, whether or not
sanctified by religious authority, can abridge?" The carnage of war-
fare, as well as the abuses of religious authority, broadened the
moral consciousness of many. Karl LSwith succinctly frames this
central modern problem:
Thus the human problem of "our days" is the fact that the modern bour-
geois is neither a citizen in the sense of the ancient polis, nor a whole man.
He is two things in one person; on the one hand, he belongs to himself, and
on the other, to the order civil.A8
Although the process of desacralization in the Western hemi-
sphere began much earlier than the 1780s,8" the political exclusion
of African people from the ranks of American peoplehood during
the Founders' debates about the United States Constitution illus-
trates how the intense focus of Europeans on their own freedom
could support the denial of freedom to their radical other, the Afri-
cans. The right to practice racism, and have it sanctified by religion,
revealed how glaring the anthropological fault line in the institution
of conscience could be.
The invocation of conscience to support racism (and sexism)
could not have been possible without the abysmal history of the
desacralization of the body. The tradition of minimizing the sanctity
of both the body and life itself is too often reserved for heated pre-
sent debates concerning abortion. Moreover, it is erroneously associ-
ated exclusively with the rise of liberal culture. Both advocates and
opponents of abortion rights too often divorce that discussion from
the larger question of the degree to which the human body, and life
itself, is sacred.
Nonetheless, the primary cultural fault line of conscience reveals
an institution that exists at the mercy of the idolatry of individual-
ity, that great engine of modernity called "individualism." The an-
thropological fault line of conscience, on the other hand, becomes
visible in the form of the fetishism of white tribalism. Two sets of
juridical events illustrate this point: the emergence of the fugitive
slave law tradition, and the twentieth-century judicial insistence
83. KARL LOWITH, FROM HEGEL TO NIETZSCHE: THE REVOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
THOUGHT 232 (David E. Green trans., 3d ed., Anchor Books 1967) (1941).
84. See DAVID E. STANNARD, COLUMBUS AND THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD (1992).
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that conscience must be subordinated to nationalistic and racial ho-
mogeneity. After examining the problem of fugitive slave laws, I
will discuss the latter point in a brief review of United States v.
Macintosh.8
The appeal to the doctrine of the "sovereignty of the people" in
the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States of America86
assumed the veracity of the anthropology of the universality of
human equality pronounced in the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence. But the Founders could not bypass the problem that Afri-
can slavery posed for defining American citizenship. The tacit legiti-
mation of slavery led to the creation of a herrenvolk democracy that
could not find the national will to abolish slavery without civil war.
Appeals to the "rights of conscience" were invoked by both prosla-
very and antislavery advocates.
The Framers of the Constitution knew from their experience in
colonial self-government that doctrines of social relations greatly
impact the way governments structure public policy. Indeed, they
believed that a government that is without constraints can unduly
abridge "certain inalienable rights." They discovered early in the
constitutional debates, however, that the notion of "natural rights"
is not easily defined, especially in a society that is racially, relig-
iously, and culturally diverse. This is the core of what Gunnar Myr-
dal later called the "American dilemma. 87 Few described this di-
lemma of American republicanism as clearly and passionately as St.
George Tucker:
Whilst we were offering up vows at the Shrine of liberty, and sacrificing
hecatombs upon her altars; whilst we score irreconcilable hostility to her
enemies, and hurled defiance in their faces; whilst we adjured the God of
Hosts to witness our resolution to live free, or die, and imprecated curses on
their heads who refused to unite with us in establishing the empire of free-
dom; we were imposing upon our fellow men; who differ in complexion from
us, a slavery, ten thousand times more cruel than the utmost extremity of
those grievances and oppressions, of which we complained. Such are the in-
consistencies of human nature; . . . such that partial system of morality
which confines rights and injuries, to particular complexions; such the effect
that self-love which justifies, or condemns, not according to principle, but to
agent.88
85. 283 U.S. 605 (1931). See infra notes 149-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Macintosh,
86. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
87. See GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACY (Harper & Row 1966) (1944).
88. 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 562 (Philip B. Kirkland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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Tucker went beyond characterizing the institution of slavery as the
shadow of American democracy. He believed that it is the embodi-
ment of what I call tribal narcissism. Those who opposed the insti-
tutionalization of this tribalism knew that they had a long fight
ahead of them when the first fugitive slave law was written into the
new Constitution.
Pierce Butler and General Charles Pinckney moved on August 28,
1787, during the Federal Convention "to require fugitive slaves and
servants to be delivered up like criminals." 9 The concept of the "fu-
gitive slave" was actually introduced into American law during the
summer of 1787, first in the Northwest Ordinance, then at the Fed-
eral Convention."0 From the standpoint of jurisprudence, it gave
sanction to the right to consider slaves as property. Therefore, slav-
ery in one could not be undermined by conditions or abolitionist en-
actments in any other. If the estate of which the owner was a citizen
recognized a slave master's right to own slaves, there would be no
place in the new United States where the slave could escape. In ef-
fect, the federal government promised to guarantee that the slave
master's enslayed property would be sacrosanct.
Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States
reads as follows:
No person held to service or labor in the state, under the laws thereof, es-
caping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim
of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
This constitutional provision was a direct challenge to the institution
of conscience. The right of conscience to object to slavery was not as
well established in the land of the Puritans as was the right to reli-
gious freedom based upon the privileges extended to the institution
of conscience. But the two were not unrelated.
The legacy of European religious warfare, as well as the Puritan
Revolution, had not been forgotten. America had become the sanc-
tuary for the victims of religious intolerance. Religious pluralism
was a fact of life that insured the political necessity to legitimize
89. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 443 (1911).
90. See DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-
1820, at 207-47 (1979).
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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religious liberty in the Bill of Rights. Congregationalists,
Schwenkfelders, Amish, Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists, Roman
Catholics, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Moravians, Jews, etc.,
populated the new Republic. Those denominations that had not been
established colonial churches pressed the "rights of conscience"
more than those who had. Many of them were the beneficiaries of
those Evangelical revivals known as the "Great Awakening" and the
"Second Great Awakening." These revivals caused schisms within
religious denominations, and the creation of new ones.
They also nurtured the desire for earthly personal and social
perfection. They believed that God, speaking to and through their
conscience, disapproved all forms of oppression. Their dissatisfaction
with the status quo in both church and state contributed greatly to
energizing the agents of social and religious change. James D. Essig
reminds his readers that the institution of slavery had its first broad
religious opposition, beyond a small faction of the Quakers, as well
as other Christians, among these early Evangelicals. 2 Between 1770
and 1808,11 those denominations vigorously opposed slavery. But by
1808, "evangelical opposition to domestic slavery had largely
subsided."'
Despite inconsistent and sporadic Christian opposition, many citi-
zens believed that the fugitive slave provision of the Constitution
offended conscience."5 By 1830, this antislavery impulse quickened
under the leadership of radical abolitionists such as William Lloyd
Garrison, Frederick Douglass, Lewis Tappan, and Maria W. Chap-
man. The formation of the American Anti-Slavery Society repre-
sented the determination of many to abolish the slave regime even if
resistance meant breaking the law. They believed that God's law is
higher than human law. Maria W. Chapman, an undaunted aboli-
tionist, articulated this view with uncompromising verve in 1839 as
she spoke before the New England Non-Resistance Society:
92. See JAMES D. ESSIG, THE BONDS OF WICKEDNESS: AMERICAN EVANGELICALS AGAINST
SLAVERY, 1770-1808 (1982).
93. In 1808, Congress mandated the end of American involvement in the slave trade. Id. at xiii.
94. Id.
95. In fact, gradual abolition of slavery in several Northern states, as well as the formation of
the American Colonization Society in 1817, signalled great national discomfort about the institu-
tion of slavery among both religionists and humanists. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND
HUMAN PROGRESS (1984); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION. 1770-1823 (1975); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN
CULTURE (1966); ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
IN THE NORTH (1967).
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Passive non-resistance is one thing; active non-resistance another. We mean
to apply our principles. We mean to be bold for God. Action! - Action! -
thus shall we overcome the violent. . . . We need no body of men to tell us
when, and where, and how we may speak, but each one is bound to speak as
his own reason and conscience dictate.96
Antislavery attorneys, such as Salmon Chase and John Jolliffe, used
the language of jurisprudence to argue the same point. Two years
before Chapman uttered her latter remarks, Chase argued against
the fugitive slave law provision of the Constitution, as it was. backed
by the congressional Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, in the famous Ohio
Mathilda case: "There is such a thing as natural rights, derived not
from any constitution or civil code, but from the constitution of
"997human nature and the code of heaven ....
Such views were met with determined opposition both from those
who were for the gradual abolition of slavery and from proslavery
advocates. Many feared that appeals to what was often called "the
moral government of God" would lead to civic anarchy and religious
antinomianism.9 8 They sought to dethrone conscience as that aspect
of human judgment that pertains solely to matters of individual
human conduct. R.H. Rivers, a professor of moral philosophy at
Wesleyan College in Florence, Alabama, argued that the individual
conscience renders it "not a distinct action from judgement much
less a distinct faculty; and by no means carrying with it more proof
of accuracy and correctness than is our own judgement about any
other matter." 9 He spoke for many ethicists and jurists when he
declared earlier in his argument that "no one should place con-
science above God, or above law."' 10
The ambiguous place of conscience in these opposing views of the
relationship between human nature and citizenship underscore the
depth of intellectual morass surrounding conscience as a mediating
institution between religion, law, and ethics. In 1867, the Reverend
Dr. Henry M. Smith, against the logic of his own review of recent
96. LEWIS PERRY. RADICAL ABOLITIONISM: ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN AN-
TISLAVERY THOUGHT 247 (1973).
97. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 172
(1975).
98. See PERRY, supra note 96, at 247; see also D.H. MEYER, THE INSTRUCTED CONSCIENCE:
THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL ETHIC (1972).
99. R.H. RIVERS, ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 196 (Nashville, 1860).
100. Id. at 20. For a fuller discussion of the proslavery position, see WILLIAM SUMNER JENKINS,
PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH (1935) and H. SHELTON SMITH. IN HIS IMAGE,
BUT . . : RACISM IN SOUTHERN RELIGION, 1780-1910 (1972).
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studies of conscience, pleaded: "Conscience, now gagged and shack-
led, will survive these indignities and restraints. It is indestructible;
and when probation terminates, the finished life moves in review
before its unbandaged gaze."' 1 But what happened between the
1790s and 1867 that would lead this Presbyterian divine to offer a
defense of conscience?
The problem of slavery and racism in this period refused to re-
treat from the consciousness of the nation. By 1845, nearly every
major religious denomination split over whether or not Christians
should hold slaves."0 2 With the exception of the Civil War itself,
perhaps no series of events exposed the ambiguity of conscience as a
legal and moral construct as did the Supreme Court's decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford.' This case, commonly referred to as the
Dred Scott decision, focused on three of the important issues left
unresolved by the drafters of the Constitution. That is: 1) the issue
of states' rights; 2) the nature of citizenship; and 3) the limits and
nature of property rights.
The possible expansion of the institution of slavery into the west-
ern territories exacerbated these issues. The problem of possibly ex-
panding the political power of slavocracy unmasked how captive
American jurisprudence was to biological and social determinism"',
despite the egalitarian rhetoric of its liberal ideology. 08 The exis-
tence of a people who were viewed as outcasts'06 raised serious ques-
tions about the nature of citizenship. The gravity of this crisis be-
came painfully evident in the suit of Dred Scott, a free black whose
"right" to move freely between slave, as well as free, states and ter-
ritories, was severely tested by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. The
Supreme Court's decision in this case confirmed the pervasive suspi-
cion that many jurists were obsessed with a tenacious commitment
101. Henry M. Smith, What is Conscience?, 18 S. PRESBYTERIAN REV. 430-31 (1867).
102. See DAVID T. BAILEY, SHADOW ON THE CHURCH: SOUTHWESTERN EVANGELICAL RELI-
GION AND THE ISSUE OF SLAVERY, 1783-1860 (1985); C.C. GOEN, BROKEN CHURCHES, BROKEN
NATION: DENOMINATIONAL SCHISMS AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1985);
JOHN R. McKIVIGAN, THE WAR AGAINST PROSLAVERY RELIGION: ABOLITIONISM AND THE
NORTHERN CHURCHES, 1830-1865 (1984).
103, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
104. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON
AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1971).
105. See Louis HARTZ. THE LIBERAL TRADITION: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955).
106. See JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL
INFERIORITY, 1859-1900 (1971); JAMES A. RAWLEY, RACE AND POLITICS: "BLEEDING KANSAS"
AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1969).
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to a retrogressive "legal anthropology ' ' 10 7 that assumed African-
American inferiority. In 1857, the Supreme Court articulated a
widely accepted legal anthropology that was based on a racist un-
derstanding of the nature of American citizenship. The Court de-
cided in Dred Scott that the denial of citizenship to persons of Afri-
can descent was justified because the Framers of the Constitution
did not view Africans as "constituent members of sovereignty."' 08
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney stated
as a matter of fact that "[wie think they [Africans] are not, and
that they are not included, and were not intended to be included
" . .,109 in the social compact. Later, Taney was even more pointed
in articulating the Court's historical and anthropological assump-
tions: "They had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race . . .; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly
and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit."" 0
Taney's opinion reflected the pervasive view in American jurispru-
dence that African people could not be citizens either by birth,"'
religious conversion," 2 or naturalization.I1 3 Taney assumed the le-
gitimacy of the notion of chattel slavery, as well as reasserted the
innate biological and social inferiority of African-Americans. Jus-
tices John McLean and Benjamin Curtis dissented. According to
Justice McLean, the majority of the Court was wrong in its refusal
to recognize the natal rights of an American just because of African
ancestry. For him, this was "more a matter of taste than of law."" 4
Justice Curtis's argument appealed to the older precedent of the
state laws of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New
107. This term is used by Professor Horwitz in his illuminating discussion of JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 178 (1992).
108. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 407.
111. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1982).
112. From the late seventeenth century, an Anglo-American consensus emerged in several colo-
nial legislatures, including Maryland, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, in the form
of "laws reassuring masters that conversion of their slaves did not necessitate manumission." See
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO. 1550-
1812, at 92-94 (1977).
113. For a thorough historical analysis of the problem of naturalization, see JAMES H.
KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978).
114. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 533.
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Jersey, and North Carolina under the period of the Articles of Con-
federation (1781-1787), which granted citizenship to all free native-
born inhabitants.11"
This reduced the disagreement within the Court to a matter of
historical interpretation. Justice McLean's pointed reference to the
role of bigotry sanctioned by custom in this decision rescued the
dissenters from juridical obfuscation. But it also disclosed how judi-
cial moral blindness helped to place American legal anthropology in
a moribund state. Even McLean was unwilling to allow custom in
the form of legal precedence to be overthrown by the ambiguous
moral shadow of conscience. On November 10, 1850, he had al-
ready confided in a letter to the Reverend Jona Wald about the Fu-
gitive Slave Law that "formerly the enforcement of the 'higher law'
[conscience] caused more wars and bloodshed in the world, than all
other causes united. . . . Conscience is not always a sure guide.""'
He strived for a via media between his own desire for judicial cer-
tainty; the pressures of a historic and prophetic moment in Ameri-
can history, and the demands of judicial restraint. He eschewed
both social "taste" and "conscience," and embraced historical pre-
cedent as the only sure protection against anarchy."'
It seems to be an oxymoron to suggest that governments them-
selves can be the agents of anarchy. Governments are supposed to
make and enforce laws that insure societal tranquility. The enact-
ment of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, however, challenged this
assumption. Many felt that the Fugitive Slave Law disregarded the
prior moral authority of conscience. The Reverend Samuel T. Spear
preached a sermon in 1850 declaring that the government, when it
passes legislation such as the Fugitive Slave Law, uses its legislative
authority to supplant the moral government of God:
Forget not that morality and God are older and more infallible than the
Constitution, and that a compromise with wrong for the sake of union does
not convert it into right. Those who choose to give up their moral sense to
the decisions of the Constitution, let them do so; I will not. I acknowledge
no such citizenship under any government man ever made, as destroys the
present obligation invariable and irrepealable of the Supreme Rule." 8
115. Id. at 572-76.
116. COVER, supra note 97, at 248.
117. Id.
118. SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW-ABIDING CONSCIENCE, AND THE HIGHER LAW CONSCIENCE,
WITH REMARKS ON THE FUGITIVE SLAVE QUESTION: A SERMON, PREACHED IN THE SOUTH PRES-
BYTERIAN CHURCH, BROOKLYN, [NY], DEC. 12, 1850 (New York, Lambert & Lane, Stationers &
Printe's 1850).
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The Reverend Mr. Spear proposed a schizoid definition of con-
science. He identified the nature of its twoness as being torn be-
tween a conscience that is committed to obedience to the laws of the
nation-state, as well as obedient to God's Higher Law which we
know through the conscience. Besides appealing to enlightened obe-
dience to both laws, he was unable to resolve the dilemma of being
committed to two different sovereigns, God and the nation-state.
This insistence on obedience to the Court's decision could not fore-
stall examples of disobedience in the form of John Brown's Raid on
Harper's Ferry in 1859, as well as other lesser known events. Ac-
cording to Professors Potter and Fehrenbacher, "The Dred Scott de-
cision was a failure because the justices followed a narrow legalism
which led them into the untenable position of pitting the Constitu-
tion against basic American values, although the Constitution in
fact derives its strength from its embodiment of American val-
ues."' 19 The doctrine of America as a country of free people could
not be sustained by reason alone, nor by appeals to conscience, nor
even by civil warfare. In fact, James H. Kettner correctly concludes
that "[niot logic, but force, finally answered these questions."'12 0 It
was military force, and not morality, that temporarily ameliorated
conscience's anthropological fissure.
Public opinion before and after the Civil War seemed only to
heighten the ambiguous, if not the schizoid, development of the in-
stitution of conscience.' After the Civil War, several amend-
ments "' to the Constitution embodied a political compromise that
enabled Africans to be citizens of the United States. A de facto
denizenship still awaited the liberated slaves, however. The end of
political Reconstruction in 1877 reflected despair and indifference
about the validity of including people of African descent in the body
politic. A national conscience, at ease in its political Zion - busily
continuing to build a righteous empire 23 - numbed its moral sensi-
119. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 292 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1976).
120. KETTNER, supra note 113, at 351.
121. For an excellent historical analysis of public opinion before and during the Civil War
regarding the nature of African-American citizenship, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1988).
122. The Thirteenth (1865), Fourteenth (1868), and Fifteenth (1870) Amendments were the
three historic post-Civil War constitutional amendments that were ratified in order to insure the
citizenship rights of African-Americans.
123. The theme of the United States as a nation with a religious mission is a major one in
American religious historiography. Among the many studies of this theme, see MARTIN E
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bilities against the terrorism that stalked the African-American
community for more than a century after the Civil War. 24 Mean-
while, most of the judiciary remained largely committed to a racist
jurisprudence that turned most of its energies between the Civil
War and the 1930s to consolidating the massive capitalist effort to
protect business interests. 25 This historical phenomenon was aided
by a positivist jurisprudence that was soft on securing human rights,
but adamant about solidifying the rights of corporations as if they
were "persons. "126
Monsignor Jeremiah Newman reminds us that "legal positiv-
ism"' 27 dominated Anglo-American jurisprudence by the 1860s.'28
According to Newman:
Positivism in law might be described as the view that legality rests on some
basis other than natural law. It is most generally expressed under the form
of what is called statist positivism, namely, that law stems from the naked
command of the legislator as embodying the will of the State."29
From this standpoint, the Civil War was the most pronounced em-
bodiment of statist positivism in nineteenth-century America. The
state used the power to wage war to secure its prerogative to define
the meaning and responsibilities of citizenship. But this happened
without much assistance from the institution of conscience. 130
MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (1970); SIDNEY E.
MEAD. THE NATION WITH THE SOUL OF A CHURCH (1975); LEONARD 1. SWEET, BLACK IMAGES
OF AMERICA, 1784-1870, at 69-124 (1976); ERNEST TUVESON, THE REDEEMER NATION: THE IDEA
OF AMERICA'S MILLENIAL ROLE (1968).
124. Several recent studies accent the manner and degree of racist violence against African-
Americans. They include RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MoB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND
THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988); SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA
RACE RIOT OF 1921 (1982); HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY (1988); JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-
WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984).
125. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 65-107; GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRI-
UMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963). For
an excellent biography which illustrates this trend, see RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN:
AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990).
126. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. RR., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (declaring that
a corporation is a person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment).
127. JEREMIAH NEWMAN, CONSCIENCE VERSUS LAW: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF
NATURAL LAW 104-19 (1971).
128. Id. at 105. Newman correctly cites JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES IN JURISPRUDENCE (1861) as
an illustration of the dominance of legal positivism in this period.
129. NEWMAN, supra note 127, at 104.
130. One exception to this generalization was the recognition of the tradition of the "conscien-
tious objector" to warfare. In fact a delegation from the Society of Friends spoke approvingly of
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In fact, the close reading of the most thorough historian' of the
law of church and state provided very few instances where appeals
to conscience between 1879132 and 193113 survived the state's often
unwitting subversion of appeals to conscience. It is important to
keep in mind that this development was not malevolent. Indeed, it
was often quite unconscious. Positivism 3 ' had many guises. Its de-
velopment in public affairs, 36 the social sciences (especially psychol-
ogy and sociology), 3 6 theology,3 7 and philosophy, 1 8 probably did
as much to undermine the authority of conscience as did the tenuous
the way the administration of President Abraham Lincoln respected their pacifism in a report to
their fellow Quakers: "They were grateful not only for the relief afforded Friends, but especially
for [Lincoln's] and the Government's recognition of the rights of conscience, and the respect they
had manifested for religious scruples." But the nineteenth-century conscientious objector usually
had to pay the equivalent in money or service for refusing to fight. See EDWARD NEEDLES
WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR 128 (1931).
131. See 2 STOKES, supra note 75, at 255-758; 3 id. at 3-365.
132. For the first of a series of Mormon cases concerning polygamy, see Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). A very helpful historical study of this phenomenon can be found in
RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 105-81 (1986).
133. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
134. In speaking of twentieth-century philosophical positivism, William Barrett characterizes
the positivist's attitude toward perennial, if not ancient, problems:
The great philosophic problems of the past were to be declared pseudoproblems, and
the great figures of the past were portrayed as men fighting with empty shadows. The
resulting scheme that issued from positivism had at least the virtue of overwhelming
simplicity. All problems were either questions of fact or questions of logic.
WILLIAM BARRETT, THE ILLUSION OF TECHNIQUE: A SEARCH FOR MEANING IN A TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CIVILIZATION 7 (1978). Research assumed the status of a secular messianic hope. See MAR-
TIN HEIDEGGER, The Age of the World Picture, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY
AND OTHER ESSAYS 115 (William Lovitt trans., Harper & Row 1977). Heidegger declares that
"the modern research experiment, however, is not only an observation more precise in degree and
scope, but is a methodology . I..." d. at 122.
135. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA (1977), especially the chapter entitled "The Province of Law." id. at 343.
136. The best study of the development of the social sciences in the United States is DOROTHY
Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991). Although Professor Ross often alludes
to importance of "race" in this process, she is less sanguine about the role of racism in spawning
American social scene where other scholars tend to be more emphatic. See HALLER, JR., supra
note 106; JOHN H. STANFIELD, PHILANTHROPY AND JIM CROW IN AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1985); GEORGE W. STOCKING, JR., VICTORIAN ANTHROPOLOGY (1987).
137. The best study of the gargantuan impact of positivism on the development of theology in
the Anglo-American Victorian world is CHARLES D. CASHDOLLAR. THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THEOLOGY, 1830-1890: POSITIVISM AND PROTESTANT THOUGHT IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (1989).
How positivism interacted with other forms of theological modernism is discussed with disciplined
verve and sensitivity in WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON, THE MODERNIST IMPULSE IN AMERICAN PROTES-
TANTISM (1976). See also BRUCE KUKLICK, CHURCHMEN AND PHILOSOPHERS: FROM JONATHAN
EDWARDS TO JOHN DEWEY (1985).
138. See RICHMOND LAURIN HAWKINS, POSITIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1853-1861 (1938);
KUKLICK, supra note 137, at 230-61; ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1991).
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cultural wedding between Christianity and American culture. 3 9 But
its most practical (and perhaps effective) influence was upon juris-
prudence. The great jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., challenged
his colleagues to embrace legal positivism in his famous treatise The
Common Law."0 According to Holmes, who was then coeditor of
The American Law Review.:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt neces-
sities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed." 1
This was an unapologetic, pragmatic" 2 appreciation for how experi-
ence, especially in its historical guise, shapes modern jurisprudence.
It was a fresh and influential insistence that jurists embrace practi-
cality rather than sanctity as the best guide to justice. 43 Morton J.
Horwitz argues that the twentieth-century triumph of "legal positiv-
ism" that Justice Holmes embodied represented "a new urgency to
distinguish sharply between law and morals."'14 4 But this "urgency"
required more than the "decline of Darwinism,""' 5 as Professor
139. Robert T. Handy offers an incisive historical analysis of the intricate series of cultural,
ecclesiastical, and political processes that created this largely Protestant hegemony in ROBERT T.
HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES.(2d ed. 1984).
H. Richard Niebuhr produced classic studies of the mergence of religion and culture in American
society that still remain highly influential. See H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE
(1951); H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN AMERICA (1937); H. RICHARD
NIEBUHR. THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF DENOMINATIONALISM (1929) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, THE So-
CIAL SOURCES OF DENOMINATION].
140. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Little, Brown
& Co. 1963) (1881).
141. Id. at 5.
142. Pragmatism was in its origins and sentiments directly related to positivism. Professor Hor-
witz deftly summarizes this point in showing how "consequentialism" became the key factor in
legal pragmatism:
The appearance of pragmatism in America philosophy around the turn of the century
represents a challenge to the prevailing process-oriented conception of justice that had
dominated late nineteenth-century American thought. This turn to consequentialism
in social thought is an important expression of the gradual disintegration of the belief
in neutral processes, especially a neutral market economy, as the legitimate distribu-
tor of just rewards.
HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 194-95.
143. In 1882, the year after Holmes published The Common Law, he became a professor of
law at Harvard. President Theodore Roosevelt appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1902
where he served for nearly thirty years. The important "Place of Justice Holmes" in American
jurisprudence is discussed most recently by Horwitz. Id. at 109-43.
144. Id. at 140.
145. Id. I am not disagreeing with Professor Horwitz's generalization here. But I am under-
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Horwitz asserts, to acquire juridical powers. The sacred bastion of
the institution of conscience had to be subverted. A crucial set of
Supreme Court decisions 46 that reflected the appearance of this
phase of what I call "the eclipse of Protestant hegemony"14 sig-
nalled the critical shift in legal and social scientific anthropology
from an early Victorian emphasis on the sacredness of character 48
to a psychoanalytical redefinition of conscience.
Toward the end of his distinguished tenure on the bench of the
Supreme Court,'49 Justice Holmes, often called "the Great Dis-
senter," participated in opposing the majority's decision in United
States v. Macintosh.'50 This decision is usually cited for its contri-
bution to the ongoing struggle to maintain legal respect for consci-
entious objection to warfare. But it also signified the decline of the
sanctity of conscience in American jurisprudence.
Although Professor Douglas Clyde Macintosh, a Canadian, had
served on the faculty of Yale Divinity School since 1909, several
anomalous circumstances prevented him from applying for citizen-
ship until 1925.'' Macintosh, a professor of theology and an ex-
scoring its incompleteness. The decline of Darwinism certainly led to the development of legal
pragmatism. But this is largely a nineteenth-century development. Explaining what happened be-
tween its definite decline by 1900 and the resurgence of the various forms of Realism in the 1930s
is a task beyond the scope of both Professor Horwitz's excellent study and this Essay. See JON H.
ROBERTS, DARWINISM AND THE DIVINE IN AMERICA: PROTESTANT INTELLECTUALS AND ORGANIC
EVOLUTION, 1859-1900 (1988). Nevertheless, Professor Degler complicates glib generalizations
about social Darwinism's history by reminding the students of that history that decline does not
necessarily mean defeat. See CARL N. DEGLER. IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE
AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991).
146. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
147. For a brilliant analysis of the importance of conscience to the theological jurisprudence of
Calvinistic Protestantism, see DAVID LITTLE, RELIGION, ORDER, AND LAW: A STUDY IN PRE-
REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND 33-80 (1969).
148. See STANLEY COBEN, REBELLION AGAINST VICTORIANISM: THE IMPETUS FOR CULTURAL
CHANGE IN 1920s AMERICA 3-35 (1991), where Coben discusses the decline of the influence of the
Victorian notion of character in American culture. Despite his enriching insights, he overlooks this
development as another important instance of his argument, and as a sign of the increasing influ-
ence of psychoanalytical language in the United States. See NATHAN G. HALE, JR., FREUD AND
THE AMERICANS: THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1876-1917
(1971); JOHN R. SEELEY, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (1967). Freudianism's
influence was especially keenly felt among "mainline" American religionists. See ANN ELIZABETH
ROSENBERG, FREUDIAN THEORY AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS JOURNALS, 1900-1965 (1980); AL-
LISON STOKES, MINISTRY AFTER FREUD (1985).
149. Justice Holmes retired from the bench in 1932.
150. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
151. PRESTON WARREN, OUT OF THE WILDERNESS: DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH'S JOURNEYS
THROUGH THE GROUNDS AND CLAIMS OF MODERN THOUGHT 1-2 (1989).
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ceedingly scrupulous person, refused to answer Question #22 on the
naturalization form in the affirmative.' The form stated, "If neces-
sary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?"' 153
The immigration officer denied Macintosh's application. Macintosh
took the matter before the United States District Court of Connecti-
cut where he argued:
[I]ust as the native-born citizen is a citizen without having had to promise
beforehand that he will support any and every war which any future Gov-
ernment of the country may engage in during his lifetime, so, it seemed to
me, the naturalized citizen ...who has not been required to make any
immoral promise to do what might possibly seem wrong to him when the
time came.""
Macintosh himself did not directly appeal to conscience as a defense
for his decision not to invest the state with the privileges of moral
sovereignty. But he appealed to the doctrine of just war' 55 rather
than the sanctuary of American pacifism, the institution of con-
science. He also went beyond an appeal to justa bella. He claimed
access to "the will of God."' 58 In fact, he pitted his access to the
will of God against the government's implied privileged access: "In-
terpreting the will of God, however, as what is right and for the
highest well-being of all humanity, I felt that I ought not to put my
allegiance to any country, not even my own, above allegiance to the
will of God, thus interpreted.' 57 In short, Macintosh wanted to re-
serve the right to question the morality of government decisions that
could possibly offend the "highest well-being of all humanity" which
he believed formed the core of what he calls "the will of God." De-
spite his argument, the district court denied Macintosh citizenship.
John W. Davis, Macintosh's attorney, immediately appealed the
professor's case to the appellate court, which reversed the district
152. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 617.
153. Id.
154. WARREN, supra note 151, at 4. One of his Yale colleagues later characterized Macintosh
as a person who "believed that there is a truth and that he had it, and that this truth is of
paramount importance." ROLAND H. BAINTON, YALE AND THE MINISTRY: A HISTORY OF EDUCA-
TION FOR THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY AT YALE FROM THE FOUNDING IN 1701, at 227 (1957).
155. See 3 STOKES, supra note 75, at 271 (discussing the relevance of justa bella to this case).
For a discussion of the contribution of Christians to the development of justa bella theory and
practice offered by an eminent church historian and Quaker, see ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION
(1960). See also JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR:
A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY (1981).
156. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 618.
157. WARREN, supra note 151, at 4.
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court's denial.158
The government of the United States appealed to the Supreme
Court where a five to four majority of Justices were not convinced
by Macintosh's reasoning.' 59 The Court handed down its decision in
1931. Justice George Sutherland wrote the majority opinion that de-
nied Macintosh citizenship. The following comment in his opinion
speaks most directly to the concerns of this Essay:
When [Macintosh] speaks of putting his allegiance to the will of God above
his allegiance to the government, it is evident, in the light of his entire state-
ment, that he means to make his own interpretation of -the will of God the
decisive test which shall conclude the government and stay its hand. We are
a Christian people, according to one another the equal right of religious
freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will
of God. But, also, we are a Nation with the duty to survive; a Nation whose
Constitution contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go
forward upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that
unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the
laws of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are
not inconsistent with the will of God.
160
Justice Sutherland appealed to the Court's denial of citizenship in
an earlier case, United States v. Schwimmer,161 as a precedent for
the majority's denial of the same to Macintosh. 6 ' But he apparently
forgot the dissent of Justices Holmes and Brandeis where Holmes,
speaking for the minority, cast the case as more a "freedom of
thought" case than a religious liberty case." 3
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who wrote for the minority,
rightly dismissed Schwimmer as not being very pertinent to Macin-
tosh because it "stands upon the special facts of that case."' 64 But
he argued that one of the famous Mormon polygamy cases of the
nineteenth century 6 5 was a more pertinent precedent because the
158. Macintosh v. United States, 42 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1930).
159. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
160. Id. at 625 (citation omitted).
161. 279 U.S. 644 (1928).
162. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 620-21.
163. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654-55 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). Holmes stated:
Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of
the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate. I think that we should adhere to that principle with
regard to admission into, as well as to life within this country.
id.
164. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 635 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
165. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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majority's opinion offered a definition of religion 6 that he believed
was applicable in the Macintosh case. Hughes argued that this defi-
nition of religion is similar to Macintosh's definition because both
definitions embrace the notion of "the will of God" as being central
to most understandings of religion.'1 7 According to Hughes, "One
cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper appreciation of its es-
sential and historic significance, without assuming the existence of a
belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God." '68 Indeed, Hughes
argued that Professor Macintosh, "when pressed," believed that the
religionist has a paramount duty to obey the will of God. For Mac-
intosh, this is "what is axiomatic in religious doctrine." '69 Chief Jus-
tice Hughes believed that the majority's opinion in the Macintosh
case posed a threat to the institution of conscience. He declared,
"And, putting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of de-
ity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate convic-
tion of paramount duty."17 0
Hughes believed that the majority's emphasis on duty to country
placed country above duty to God. Although Hughes did not say
this directly, he implied that there was a danger here of making the
state itself a religion. In fact, he introduced his focus on the doctrine
of the will of God with the assertion that the decision to place loy-
alty to God above loyalty to the state did not necessarily mean that
conflict between the two would ensue. But he reminded the majority
that legal respect for the sanctity of conscience had been a noble
and longstanding tradition in American jurisprudence. His entire
statement needs to be repeated for the sake of emphasis:
Much has been said [in Justice Sutherland's opinion] of the paramount duty
to the State, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts
with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the State exists
within the domain of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws
regardless of scruples. When one's belief collides with the power of the
State, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or punishment
follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the State has always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obli-
166. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 634 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Hughes quoted the
following definition of religion given by Justice Stephen J. Field, who wrote for the majority in
Davis v. Beason: "'The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator,
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to
his will.'" Id. (quoting Davis, 133 U.S. at 342).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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gation, as a matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many of
our conscientious and law-abiding citizens.
17 1
Justice Sutherland, however, had already accused Professor Mac-
intosh of not being "attached to the principles of the Constitu-
tion. 17 2 In a direct repudiation of Macintosh's "carefully prepared"
brief, Sutherland argued that Macintosh asserts the existence of a
constitutional right that is nonexistent.' 3 With obvious irritation,
Sutherland blasted Macintosh's reasoning with these words:
This, if it means what it seems to say, is an astonishing statement. Of
course, there is no such principle of the Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The
conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedi-
ence to no constitutional provision, expressed or implied; but because, and
only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve
him.1
74
The really surprising aspect of this skillful argument .is its display of
"social amnesia"'' 75 and legal indifference to the sanctity of con-
science. Justice Sutherland either did not know, or had forgotten,
that the constitutional debates were very much concerned with the
problem of insuring legal respect for the sanctity of conscience.""6
Chief Justice Hughes concluded his objection with a pointed re-
minder to the majority that Macintosh's assertion of the constitu-
tionality of his right to have religious scruples was "not in opposi-
tion to, but in accord with, the theory and practice of our
Government in relation to freedom of conscience.' 1 77
171. Id.
172. Id. at 616.
173. Id. at 623. Sutherland quotes the following remark from Macintosh's brief:
"To demand from an alien who desires to be naturalized an unqualified promise to
bear arms in every war that may be declared, despite the fact that he may have
conscientious religious scruples against doing so in some hypothetical future war,
would mean that such an alien would come into our citizenry on an unequal footing
with the native born, and that he would be forced, as the price of citizenship, to
forego a privilege enjoyed by others. That is the manifest result of the fixed principle
of our Constitution, zealously guarded by our laws, that a citizen cannot be forced
and need not bear arms in a war if has conscientious religious scruples against doing
SO."
Id.
174. Id.
175. "Social amnesia is society's repression of remembrance - society's own past. It is a
psychic commodity of the commodity society." RUSSELL JACOBY. SOCIAL AMNESIA: A CRITIQUE
OF CONFORMIST PSYCHOLOGY FROM ADLER TO LAING 5 (1975).
176. For a general survey of the impact of the struggle for religious freedom during the 1780s
and 1790s, see 1 STOKES, supra note 75, at 366-646, and SMITH, supra note 75, at 2-90.
177. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 635 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
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In 1931, the Supreme Court, and indeed the entire nation, was
undergoing profound changes. 7 ' New alliances were forming across
traditional boundaries in order to address pressing concerns. This
was particularly true in the intellectual arena. Shifts in the foci of
both theology and jurisprudence were far more evident in the Mac-
intosh case than most of its observers have noted. 1 9 Elwyn A.
Smith, a quite astute student of the career of the relation between
religion and conscience, correctly observed that the Macintosh ma-
jority "identified" Macintosh's "conscience as secular."' 80 But inat-
tention to changes in both jurisprudence and theology led him to
characterize the crisis incorrectly as a crisis in the privacy of con-
science rather than as a crisis in the social, political, ethical, and
religious meanings of conscience. For most of its public career, the
institution of conscience had an honorable role in shaping an Ameri-
can public ethics. But by the 1920s and 1930s, conscience was so
confused with its cousin concepts, consciousness and conscientious-
ness, that several students of casuistry sought to address the crisis in
its meaning. 181
One notable nineteenth-century American theologian had de-
clared in the 1870s that "man's conscience and its education
through centuries of history are the work of God, or nothing is. ' 2
The prevalent belief that conscience was a byproduct of a progres-
sive revelation that is revealed in history could not withstand the
growing influence of critical historical consciousness. Not even the
learned philosopher Josiah Royce, with his tireless commitment to
idealism, could withstand this development. He reflected the frustra-
tion of many in a series of questions that also haunted many. Ac-
cording to Royce:
Our differences regarding our conscience begin when questions arise of the
following sort: Is our conscience inborn? Is it acquired by training? Are its
dictates the same in all men? Is it God-given? Is it infallible? Is it a sepa-
178. See HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 169-212, for a discussion of changes in jurisprudence.
For astute discussions of major theological transitions during this period, see the following: WIL-
LIAM DEAN, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EMPIRICISM (1986); HUTCHISON, supra note 137, at 288-310;
RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER, THE AMERICAN SPIRIT IN THEOLOGY (1974).
179. See PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 27-28 (1964); MILTON R. KON-
VITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 35-37, 88-89 (1968);
Smith, supra note 75, at 250-52; SMITH, supra note 75, at 269-74.
180. See Smith, supra note 75, at 251.
'181. See KIRK, supra note 42; T.V. SMITH. BEYOND CONSCIENCE (1934).
182. NEWMAN SMITH, OLD FAITHS IN NEW LIGHT 69 (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1879). See ROBERTS, supra note 145, at 174-208.
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rate power of the mind? Or is it simply a name for a collection of habits of
moral judgment which we have acquired through social training, through
reasoning, and through personal experience of the consequences of
conduct? 1
3
John Dewey led the pragmatists in saying "yes" to Royce's last
question. In a classic manifesto on the nature of moral knowledge,
Dewey advanced the position that conscience is a byproduct of so-
cialization, not, as some contended, "an original faculty of illumina-
tion. 18 4 In Dewey's words:
In language and imagination we rehearse the responses of others just as we
dramatically enact other consequences. We foreknow how others will act,
and the foreknowledge is the beginning of judgement passed on action. We
know with them; there is conscience. An assembly is formed within our
breast which discusses and appraises proposed and performed acts.18
Dewey argued that conscience is a form of moral and social knowl-
edge acquired through education and experience. It is not a subsidi-
ary of either moral intuitionism or consciousness. Dewey was the
enemy of any equivocal epistemology that preached the erroneous
belief that knowledge is discontinuous with "the workings of natural
impulses in connection with environment."' 18 However, Dewey had
two major opponents187 who stated their case in the 1930s against
his effort to socialize conscience.
In order to appreciate the critiques levelled by Reinhold Niebuhr
and T.V. Smith, the public status of conscience in the 1920s needs
to be mentioned. Dewey's strategic redefinition of the social founda-
tions of conscience was a crucial buoy in the midst of a tidal wave of
secular psychologizing, if not attempted dissipation, of conscience.
The effort to overthrow Victorian fidelity to the questionable thera-
peutic value of "guilt," among devotees of popular Freudianism, led
many to associate conscience with having the chief agency for fo-
183. JOSIAH ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY 166 (1908).
184. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 187 (Henry Holt & Co. 1957) (1922).
185. Id. at 315.
186. Id. at 187. The resurgence of this self-conscious Aristotelian view of the relation between
personality and nature was quite widespread among the intelligentsia in both Europe and the
United States. See H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY: THE REORIENTATION OF
EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1890-1930 (1958); JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY:
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920
(1986); HENRY F. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF
OUR OWN TIME, 1912-1917 (1959).
187. There were of course many others. But the critiques of Green and Niebuhr are more
pertinent to my point.
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menting guilt within the human psyche. One well-known religious
psychologist complained bitterly about this state of affairs. He said,
"The average psychology pays little, if any, attention to conscience.
An examination of 20 secular psychologies, selected from a shelf
almost at random, revealed the fact that out of 10,070 pages not one
page was devoted to conscience." 188 Vergilius Ferm, a noted Lu-
theran philosopher of religion, joined in this complaint, and added,
"There have been abuses of the appeals to conscience in the past,
just as there are abuses of all of God's choicest gifts. But when even
the church begins to systematically ignore conscience, conscience is
a force of sufficient activity and vitality to break the old wine-
skins." '89 Many felt that the jaded house of conscience - some felt
hopelessly in bondage to the problems of theism - had crashed on
the precarious shores of modernity. 90
Reinhold Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society' could
not have been published at a more propitious time. It was a crisp
and prophetic, but nuanced, defense of the possibility of individual
moral integrity in the midst of incalculable public cynicism and de-
featism. In fact, Ralph Henry Gabriel defined this era as "individu-
alism at Bay." ' a In the midst of one of the deepest economic de-
pressions in American history, the heroism of the moral individual
was under seige. Resentment toward the wealthy who flaunted their
status during the 1920s grew in proportion to the depth of the mis-
ery. But many of the churches who belonged to the Federal Council
of Churches had benefitted from, and aligned themselves with,
wealth,"9 ' and based this behavior on a liberal doctrine of human
188. O.M. NORLIE, AN ELEMENTARY CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY 143 (1924). This is also quoted
in VERGILIUS FERM, WHAT IS LUTHERANISM?: A SYMPOSIUM IN INTERPRETATION 263 (1930).
189. FERM, supra note 188, at 264.
190. See WALTER MARSHALL HORTON, THEISM AND THE MODERN MOOD (1930).
191. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND
POLITICS (Charles Scribner's Sons 1960) (1932).
192. RALPH HENRY GABRIEL. & ROBERT H. WALKER, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMO-
CRATIC THOUGHT 443-67 (3d ed. 1986).
193. For a very accessible recent introduction to this chummy ethos that nurtured and sus-
tained most of the Protestant denominations who belonged to the Federal Council of Churches
since it was founded in 1908, see 2 MARTIN E. MARTY. MODERN AMERICAN RELIGION: THE
NOISE OF CONFLICT, 1919-1941, at 33-58 (1991). Most of the major African-American denomi-
nations belonged to the Federal Council of Churches. While a few of their larger urban ministers
and congregations benefitted from the largess of the wealthy, usually racialist, if not racist, pa-
tronizing accompanied such relationships. The patronage that John Wanamaker of Philadelphia
extended to the Reverend Charles Albert Tindley, the famous gospel music patriarch and pastor
of the East Calvary Methodist Episcopal Church, would be an example of this peculiar gratuity.
Although the nature and depth of the "friendship" between Tindley and Wanamaker is not fully
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nature and an ebullient belief in progress."" Some religious leaders
like Reinhold Niebuhr' 95 grew increasingly embarrassed about the
too often uncritical acceptance of the alliance between religion and
undisciplined capitalism.
Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society is not often read as a
defense of conscience. But it was. Niebuhr and his cohorts believed
that it was absolutely necessary to distance themselves from the
seemingly glib optimism that liberal culture had toward human na-
ture, progress, and secular culture. If a prophetic critique of status
quo was to have a viable intellectual foundation, it would be of cru-
cial importance to rebuild its foundations which rested partly upon
the ancien regime of conscience. After asserting correctly that natu-
ral sociologists, such as Herbert Spencer and Edward Westermarck,
had reduced conscience to "fear of the group," Niebuhr fired this
salvo at the forces of nihilism and cynicism by dismissing the notion
that conscience is a social phenomenon. "Obviously," Niebuhr rea-
soned, "defiance" of one's community "points to a force of con-
science, more individual than social." In fact, for Niebuhr:
The individual character of conscience does not preclude the determination
of most moral judgments by the opinions of the group. Most individuals lack
the intellectual penetration to form independent judgments and therefore ac-
cept the moral opinions of their society. Even when they do form their own
judgments there is no certainty that their sense of obligation toward moral
values, defined by their own mind, will be powerful enough to overcome the
fear of social disapproval. The social character of most moral judgments and
the pressure of society upon an individual are both facts to be reckoned
with; but neither explains the peculiar phenomenon of the moral life, usually
called conscience.1 96
Niebuhr believed that the deontologist's urge to "cultivate" a sense
of duty would also, be an insufficient explanation of the wellsprings
evident in his very helpful, but uncritical, biography, see RALPH H. JONES, CHARLES ALBERT
TINDLEY: PRINCE OF PREACHERS 82 (1982). The cultural alienation between blacks and whites is
revealed most notably in their music. For an excellent recent study of the African-American gos-
pel music tradition, see MICHAEL W. HARRIS, THE RISE OF GOSPEL BLUES: THE MUSIC OF
THOMAS ANDREW DORSEY IN THE URBAN CHURCH (1992).
194. The classic study of this phenomenon was published in 1929 by Reinhold Niebuhr's
brother, a professor of theological ethics at Yale Divinity School. See NIEBUHR, THE SOCIAL
SOURCES OF DENOMINATIONALISM, supra note 139.
195. For a fine biography of Niebuhr, see RICHARD WIGHTMAN Fox, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A
BIOGRAPHY (1985). The social and political activities of Protestant religious leaders are examined
in two excellent and enduring studies: DONALD B. MEYER, THE PROTESTANT SEARCH FOR POLITI-
CAL REALISM, 1919-1941 (2d ed. 1988); ROBERT MOATS MILLER, AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND
SOCIAL ISSUES, 1919-1939 (1958).
196. NIEBUHR, supra note 191, at 36-37.
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of conscience, nor do the other rational sources of conscience, such
as the many forms of human virtue. Niebuhr then brilliantly de-
scribes how captive they are to the infinite regressions of individual
and collective egoism.' 97
Many, including Niebuhr, began to fear 9 ' the emergence of a
henotheistic state that identified the will of the government with the
will of God. Such theological ideologies were evident in Japan, Ger-
many, and Italy where fascism began to raise its infamous head.
T.V. Smith's cri de coeur for conscience, published the year after
Hitler's Nazis cunningly absorbed the Weimar Republic after burn-
ing the Reichstag, 19 certainly was also deeply troubled by what
some erroneously viewed as quotidian assaults on democracy at
home and abroad. According to Smith, "Nationalism is a-brewing
its heady wine of secular sacredness with so enlarged a version of
conscience that they infer the presence or absence of citizenly inten-
tion by the inner conformity to this outer order. °20 0 Through several
stinging disclosures and critiques of the Hobbesian impulse in the
majoritarian ideology of Rousseau, Smith cites United States v.
Macintosh20 as a crucial example of the creeping transformation of
American Jeffersonian democracy into a new Leviathan.
Unlike Rousseau, the Supreme Court in Macintosh identified the
will of the state with God's will. According to Smith, "The Supreme
Court judges to be of supreme importance in crucial cases the prior-
ity of public to private conscience. "202 Smith was appalled and star-
197. It is strange that Niebuhr does not discuss the obvious impact of Freudianism on his
thought. In fact, he seems to be more interested in tracing the Christian roots in Augustinian
thought of what are obvious Freudian perspectives. Niebuhr did, however, later distance himself
from Freud in his Gifford Lectures where he argued that "Freudianism pretends to explain all the
complexities of man's spirit in biological terms but fails to explain how biological impulses should
have become transmuted into such highly complex spiritual phenomena." REINHOLD NIEBUHR,
THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, A CHRISTIAN INTERPRATION: HUMAN NATURE (VOL. 1) 43
(Charles Scribner's Sons 1964) (1941).
198. See PAUL HUTCHINSON, THE ORDEAL OF WESTERN RELIGION 115-16 (1933); H. RICH-
ARD NIEBUHR, RADICAL MONOTHEISM AND WESTERN CULTURE (1943); NIEBUHR, supra note
191, at 187-88.
199. The Nazis burned the Reichstag on February 27. By June 29, 1933, Minister Bernhard
Rust declared at a mass meeting of German Christians: "If anyone can lay claim to God's help,
then it is Hitler, for without God's benevolent fatherly hand, without his blessing, the nation
would not be where it stands today. It is an unbelievable miracle that God has bestowed upon our
people." ERNST CHRISTIAN HELMREICH, THE GERMAN CHURCHES UNDER HITLER: BACKGROUND,
STRUGGLE, AND EPILOGUE 138 (1979).
200. SMITH, supra note 181, at 144-145.
201. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
202. SMITH, supra note 181, at 166.
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tied at the Supreme Court's assumption that the reality, not sanc-
tity, of the "inner voice" could be substituted for the convenience of
"external order."2 ' He agreed with Chief Justice Charles Hughes's
claim that "the supremacy of conscience within its proper field" is a
cardinal principle of constitutionalism dating back to both John
Locke and Thomas Jefferson. Smith had been arguing vigorously
throughout this text that conscience's nature, contra Dewey and
others, is inherently private. At this point, however, he shifts gears
without stripping his logic of its acumen. He said, "In its proper
privacy it [conscience] is supreme, nor does it lose its nature when it
becomes public."2 4 Even when conscience agrees with public senti-
ment, it does not lose its private nature. But if conscience goes
against "public declarations," it makes little sense to invalidate it
because its nature is private. Smith insisted that the way to over-
come this effort to invalidate conscience because of its "nature" is to
redescribe its nature, not redefine it.
For him, the difficulty confronting conscience in the new Levia-
than was more a problem of aesthetics than ethics. But we must
keep in mind that Smith understood both to be aspects of axiology.
Smith believed that value theory itself is subservient to conscious-
ness. Thus, it is better, and more accurate, to see conscience as a
dimension of consciousness. He argued that "at least inside con-
sciousness, it is better to attend to the voice of conscience, regardless
of what its voice prescribes, since it is the catalyzer of the self."20 5
He understood his dilemma, however, once conscience is severed
from ethics. He asked, "But with conscience thus dissevered from
conduct and hospitably housed in the ivory tower of the utterly sub-
jective, what are we to do with the not infrequent claim of con-
science to be the basis of social order?"210 By using an intellectual
strategy, reminiscent of Reinhold Niebuhr, who he describes as a
"Christian-communistic" servant of "half-hearted deprecations of
'immoral' elements in democratic societies," Smith advised his read-
ers to spurn defeatism and accept "the aesthetic attitude which I
have recommended, and a strategic technique thereto, psychoanaly-
sis, the brain child of an essentially Oriental mind. 2 0 7 But neither
203. Id. at 250.
204. Id. at 251.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 357.
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Smith's libertarian advice nor Niebuhr's Augustinian realism could
stem the desacralizing tide of modernity against the institution of
conscience.
In the historical context just described, small wonder that many,
despite the excellent respectively religious and secular apologetics of
Niebuhr and Smith, came to believe that conscience is a genteel
luxury that a socially conscious society could ill afford. Niebuhr
himself was pessimistic about the possibility of materialists either
seeing or resisting the tragedy of the demise of the sanctity of con-
science. He lamented:
We live in an age in which personal moral idealism is easily accused of
hypocrisy and frequently deserves it, It is an age in which honesty is possible
only when it skirts the edges of cynicism. All this is rather tragic. For what
the individual conscience feels when it lifts itself above the world of nature
and the system of collective relationships in which the human spirit remains
under the power of nature, is not a luxury but a necessity of the soul. Yet
there is a beauty in our tragedy. We are, at least, rid of some of our illu-
sions. We can no longer buy the highest satisfactions of the individual life at
the expense of social injustice.""8
Niebuhr fervently believed that the work of justice is powered by
disruptions of "the illusions" of a perfect society. These illusions
certainly endanger societal tranquility. But such "madness of the
soul," tempered by reason, is necessary. "One can only hope,"
Niebuhr concluded, "that reason will not destroy it before its work
is done." 0 9
The nineteenth-century glorification of individualism210 now had
to broker itself before the altar of society. Justices and intellectuals
like both Holmes and Hughes were often seen as the intellectual,
and sometimes genetic, legatees of Boston Brahmins 1t who, in turn,
were seen as the enemies of modern Americanism. Thurman Arnold
spoke for many when he rejected the impact of intellectual individu-
208. NIEBUHR, supra note 191, at 276-77.
209. Id. at 277. For a brilliant and, as usual, engaging analysis of what he calls "prophetic
pragmatism," see CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF
PRAGMATISM (1989).
210. See YEHOSHUA ARIELI, INDIVIDUALISM AND NATIONALISM IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGY
(1964).
211. In fact, according to Schneider, Holmes "[p]ersonally ... continued to cultivate the gen-
teel life of a gentleman and felt a disdain for the hard labors to which his own theories were
condemning future judges." HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 563
n.11 (1946). For a fine analysis of the extensive influence of this genteel tradition, see PETER
DOBKIN HALL, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1700-1900: PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS,
ELITES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY (1984).
[Vol. 42:11
CRISIS IN SANCTITY OF CONSCIENCE
alism on American jurisprudence: "Ideals of law arise from tie
hearts of people, not from refinements of intellectuals. 212 Despite
their rationalist suspicions about the God of the Puritans, the old-
line liberals, such as Holmes and Hughes, were nervous about for-
saking the spiritual directions of those old weathervanes atop the
New England meetinghouses. But George Santayana, surely not a
friend of the New England conscience, expressed the new-line lib-
eral consensus in this redefinition of conscience:
Conscience is an index to integrity of character, and under varying circum-
stances may retain an iron rigidity, like the staff and arrow of a weather-
vane; but if directed by sentiment only, and not by a solid science of human
nature, conscience will always be pointing in a different direction.21 8
In Girouard v. United States,2 "" Justice William 0. Douglas,
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, repudiated the Mac-
intosh decision without seeing that the idea of the sacredness of con-
science had been substituted for a view of conscience as an honora-
ble sanctuary. Freedom of thought had become the protector of the
now subordinate, but still grand, old institution of conscience. 1 5
Given the history of the institution of conscience, the difference is
subtle, but profound.
CONCLUSION
The acceptance of the legal desacralization of conscience is evi-
dent in the ambiguous professional *definitions of both conscience
and jurisprudence that are ensconced in the centennial edition of
212. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 225 (1935). For a recent analysis
of the triumph and inherited difficulties of modern liberal culture, see ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES
FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1991).
213. GEORGE SANTAYANA, The Genteel Tradition at Bay, in THE GENTEEL TRADITION: NINE
ESSAYS BY GEORGE SANTAYANA 153, 193 (Douglas L. Wilson ed., 1967).
214. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
215. Douglas said:
The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an effort to accom-
modate the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual. The victory for
freedom of thought recorded in the Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of
conscience there is a moral power higher than the State. Throughout the ages men
have suffered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority
of the State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product
of that struggle.
Id. at 68. Some commentators on this opinion misunderstood its view of conscience. For example,
Sidney F. Wheeler states that in Girouard, "Conscience and God were treated as synonyms."
Sidney F. Wheeler, Constitutional Law - Black Muslimism Is a Religion Within the Meaning
of the First Amendment, 24 GA. B.J. 519, 520 (1962) (citation omitted).
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Black's Law Dictionary.21 The authors of the latest edition define
conscience as "the moral sense" whereby we judge "the moral quali-
ties of actions, or of discriminating between right and wrong. 217
They also define conscience as "the moral rule which requires pro-
bity, justice, and honest dealing between man and man ....
How can conscience be both simultaneously an innate, individual
moral sense, as this definition implies, and a commonly recognized
"moral rule?" Granted, certainly moral governance of the self and
society are deeply yoked. The strength and effectiveness of the bond
between them, however, depends on the nature, kind, and degree of
communal norms.
In law, one would logically expect jurisprudence to be concerned
with the epistemological and axiological presuppositions that make
the bond between individual and social probity just. But, according
to Black's Law Dictionary, this is not the primary function of juris-
prudence. It defines jurisprudence as "the philosophy of law, or the
science which treats of the principles of positive law and legal rela-
tions. ' ' 21 9 In fact, the authors dismiss the idea that jurisprudence
should be concerned with either moral sense or moral duty: "It has
no direct concern with questions of moral or political policy, for they
fall under the province of ethics and legislation." 2 0 This allegiance
to intellectual bifurcation is frustrating for both its proponents and
opponents. Martha Minow correctly pinpoints the difficulty that
such "descriptions of legal reasoning" encounter when they
treat the categories of law as given receptacles, ready to contain whatever
new problem may arise. Missing from these descriptions is the possibility
that our very process of sorting may stretch some categories, contract
others, or even require us to invent a new box for what we cannot yet
classify.221
Professor Minow calls these phenomena "dilemmas of
difference. '222
Various terms like "difference" and "otherness" are used to de-
scribe and define the complex set of phenomena and issues that
216. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
217. Id. at 303.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 854.
220. Id. at 855.
221. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERI-
CAN LAw 8 (1990).
222. Id. at 19-97.
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sympathizers of "critical legal studies," like Professor Minow, seek
to explore. The expansion of the vocation and consciousness of juris-
prudence to include ethics (and other disciplines) is an attempt to
respond to the realities of cultural, racial, and sexual diversity.
I do not see myself as a detractor of religious liberty. But I do
believe that its foundations in jurisprudence, ethics, and theology
must address the postmodern awareness of the epistemological prob-
lem of representation, and the cultural, as well as moral, crisis en-
gendered by cultural diversity, and by cultural perversity in the
form of rampant nihilism and undisciplined cynicism.
Often without pinpointing the locus of this latter difficulty, Amer-
ican religionists have characterized this situation as the problem of
the invasion of the secular into the preserves of religion. Stating the
problem in this fashion encourages lamentation rather than analysis.
We need to go beyond the point of serving notice that legal respect
for the sacred has declined. We need to identify when and where the
law makes little or no provision for the sacred. I am also suggesting
that we need to reassess why and whether conscience offers a suffi-
cient moral basis for the Bill of Rights, and especially for religious
liberty.
There have been many areas of conflict between church and state
over the issue of what is sacred and what is not. They include issues
related to the sacredness of both the conscience and the body. The
state has managed rather successfully to avoid interference in mat-
ters of doctrine and polity except in situations and disputes that in-
volve religious conceptions and practices about the human body,
space (especially property), management of religious business af-
fairs, and matters concerning moral and religious principles.
Often the issues related to the assertion of the prerogatives of reli-
gious and moral principles are placed under the rubric of "con-
science." Much of the discussion related to religious liberty has
sought to define issues as they relate to the presumption of the pre-
rogatives of conscience rather than to the need to define what is
meant by conscience. Each of these in some way impinges upon the
state's reserved right and obligation, to use the words of the Pream-
ble of the United States Constitution, to "establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, priomote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and
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our Posterity . *.". ."I" This sounds like a perfectly reasonable for-
mulation. But it is really a self-authenticating assertion of the sover-
eignty of the state in the name of advancing the sovereignty of the
people. Once again a government appealed to the myth of a social
compact in order to advance its own interests.224 We are left with a
question that haunts the twentieth century: Who constrains nation-
states that turn national interests into a fetish even to the point of
destroying human life and cultural diversity?
Although I have constructivist concerns which I failed to resist
the temptation to raise throughout this Essay, I have sought to
problematize the role of conscience in American jurisprudence. The
disclosure of surds and discontinuities in an inadequate profile of
conscience's career in modern, and especially American, jurispru-
dence has been my primary objective in this exploratory Essay.
Conscience is as subject to the caldrons and anxieties of contingency
as other modern claimants for certainty.
223. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
224. See J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT (2d
ed. 1957); SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 338 (1960).
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